ARMY HISTORY

Winter 2013

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

In This Issue

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

ARMY HISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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Cover Image: Poster advertising reward for the capture of the Lincoln assassination conspirators / Library of Congress

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

The Winter 2013 issue of *Army History* presents an article by Fred L. Borch, the regimental historian and archivist for the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps, intended to educate readers about the military commission that tried the Lincoln assassination conspirators. Borch examines the reasoning behind the government's—particularly Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton's—decision to prosecute the conspirators by military tribunal rather than in the civilian courts. Sketches of the trial and all its characters are provided for the reader's understanding of the events that ultimately lead to the verdicts and sentences of the accused. Some may be surprised at, and disagree with, the author's conclusions; but none can deny this pivotal event's seminal place in history or its lasting effect on our civilian and military legal systems.

Next, readers are introduced to a relatively unsung hero of Army education and officer training. Author Wilson C. Blythe examines the impact that Arthur L. Wagner had on the training, development, and education of the Army's officers through his innovative reforms, modernization efforts, and professionalization of the Army's educational system. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw vast improvements in the way Western militaries trained and educated their officer corps. While this period saw marked growth in the area of military education for many European nations, such reforms took longer to take root in the United States. The tireless efforts of individuals like Wagner have left behind a legacy of education and training tools still in use by the Army today.

The Army Artifact Spotlight for this issue features a presentation sword given to Union Army officer, 1st Lt. Oscar D. McMillan, in 1865. This sword, a gift from McMillan's men as they mustered out of service, is an excellent example of period craftsmanship and a fitting tribute to an officer who was obviously loved and respected by the men under his command.

We also feature a call for solidarity from the chief of military history as the Army History Program enters of period of change and reorganization under the ever-present cloud of looming budget cuts and force reductions. The chief historian, in his footnote, provides more updates on the Career Program 61 initiative.

I continue to invite readers to send me their articles and commentaries on the history of the U.S. Army as well as their thoughts and comments on this publication.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor

The Chief's Corner

Robert J. Dalessandro

"We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately."

–Benjamin Franklin, 4 July 1776

As a program, it is time to take old Ben's advice. For nearly two years, I have watched the various history initiatives in the Army both flourish and fail. I have been both in awe of your abilities and the resultant initiatives and saddened by the "us against them" attitudes of some of our Army Commands. If nothing else, my experience has only strengthened my determination to build a solid and unified program. In light of the many initiatives to find efficiencies, now may be our only time to save the Army History Program.

Speaking of our program, the Army Historical Program has been less of a "program" than it has been an organic growth, sprouting or withering, depending on local conditions. The Army's history and museum assets began in many dozens of separate locations, posts, and stations, often as individual command initiatives and in response to localized needs.

As most of you are aware, the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) was initially created to write and publish the official history of the U.S. Army in World War II. CMH's mission subsequently grew, adding lineage and honors; end-of-tour oral history interviews for departing general officers; and then the centralized museum policy and collections management, but not centralized control of the museums themselves.

The Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC) grew out of a political deal between the Pennsylvania and Virginia delegations after the decision that the National Museum of the United States Army would be located in the National Capital Region. The newly created AHEC subsumed the Military History Institute, part of the Army War College (AWC), which initially served as the repository for unofficial papers of Army generals, and grew into a rich source of research materials. Coupled with AHEC's new charter to establish a museum and education center, it became increasingly focused on the general public rather than the War College. In a move to strengthen their position during these times of resource reductions, they offered staff support to the vice chief of staff of the Army.

The Combat Studies Institute began as a research and writing arm for short, combat-focused, historical monographs of use in the curriculum as part of the History Department of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Over the years, it added various "orphans" of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) such as the CAC history program, the Staff Ride program, the Military History Instructors Training course, and the Frontier Army Museum.

The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) expanded its command history program in the 1980s with additional funding and direction from a series of engaged TRADOC commanding generals, including Generals William R. Richardson, William E. DePuy, and Donn A. Starry, and a dynamic chief historian, H. O. Malone. It slowly "grew" historians at each TRADOC School and Center along with a similar growth in museums and associated collections, oddly often not focused on the supported branch, at each schoolhouse. Separately, TRADOC, CGSC, and U.S. Military Academy (USMA) have expanded and changed their historical instruction programs for their respective schools in an independent fashion.

The National Museum of the U.S. Army initiative began in the 1990s, first as part of the Center of Military History, and later, as part of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment (OASA[IE&E]). Until several months ago, the National Museum effort was completely disconnected from the Center and its Museum Division.

Continued on page 44

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ARMY HISTORY
Winter 2013



Features

Articles





NEWSNOTES

New Publications from the Combat Studies Institute Press

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press has recently issued three new publications. The first, *Vanguard of Valor, Volume II: Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan*, edited by Donald P. Wright, offers six new accounts of U.S. soldiers, at the platoon level, engaged against the enemy. With a foreword by Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, the six histories that make up the second volume continue in the tradition of *Vanguard of Valor, Volume I*. Future volumes will expand the Vanguard of Valor series to examine battalion- and brigade-level operations.

The second book, *Addressing the Fog of COG: Perspectives on the Center of Gravity in US Military Doctrine*, edited by Celestino Perez Jr., is a collection of articles by the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. These articles examine the center of gravity concept as it relates to U.S. military thought and theory. The analyses are certain to spark debate as military professionals wrestle with the complex ideas presented. Readers will find their own assumptions challenged about the meaning and utility of the center of gravity.

The third publication, *Great Commanders*, edited by Christopher R. Gabel and James H. Willbanks, is a study of seven military leaders who, while perhaps not the "greatest" commanders, should be considered great. Each of the leaders examined had successfully confronted challenges of a military nature, and in so doing, left behind timeless lessons of leadership and command.

These and other CSI publications are available for viewing and download at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CSI/.



Upcoming Conferences and Call for Papers

The eightieth annual meeting of the Society for Military History will take place 14–16 March 2013 in New Orleans, Louisiana. The conference is hosted by the Center for the Study of War and Society at the University of Southern Mississippi, with the National World War II Museum and Southeastern Louisiana University cohosting. The conference theme is "War, Society, and Remembrance." More information, including hotel and registration guidance, is available on the Society's annual meeting Web site, http://www.smh-hq.org/2013/2013annualmeeting.html.

The Maryland War of 1812 Bicentennial Commission, the United States Naval Academy, and the United States Navy's Naval History and Heritage Command will cohost a War of 1812 bicentennial conference at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, from 12 to 16 June 2013. The purpose of the conference is to recognize the historic importance of the war to the people involved and the changes it wrought in domestic and international affairs. The theme of the conference, "From Enemies to Allies: An International Conference on the War of 1812 and Its Aftermath," shows that its implications are both broad and deep. The call for papers is now open and final proposals are due 1 February 2013. Proposals may be submitted electronically. Instructions may be found at the following Web site, www.stars-pangled200.com/papers. Questions about the submission process, content of proposals, and policies and modes of presentation should be e-mailed to Bill Pencek, the executive director of the Maryland War of 1812 Bicentennial Commission, at bpencek@choosemaryland.org.

Continued on page 45

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Fred L. Borch is the regimental historian and archivist for the Judge Advocate General's Corps. He served as an Army lawyer for twenty-five years before retiring in 2005 and has been a full-time military legal historian since 2006. He received his law degree from the University of North Carolina and his master's degree in history from the University of Virginia. He also holds degrees from Davidson College, the University of Brussels (Belgium), the Judge Advocate General's School, and the Naval War College. From 2012 to 2013, he has been a visiting professor and Fulbright scholar at the Center for Terrorism and Counterterrorism at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands.



Abraham Lincoln, c. 1865

Library of Congress

A Currier & Ives print depicting the assassination of President Lincoln at Ford's Theatre on 14 April 1865/Library of Congress

"Let the Stain of Innocent Blood Be Removed from the Land"

The Trial of the Lincoln Assassination Conspirators by Military Commission

By Fred L. Borch

On 9 April 1865, Lt. Gen. Robert E. Lee surrendered his Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. Most Americans considered this act as signaling the cessation of conflict between the Union and the Confederacy. Five days later, however, jubilation over the apparent end of the war was abruptly interrupted when actor and celebrity John Wilkes Booth entered Ford's Theatre and, at point blank range, shot President Abraham Lincoln in the back of the head. At almost the same time that Booth murdered the president, his co-conspirator Lewis Thornton Powell forcibly entered the nearby home of Secretary of State William H. Seward and savagely stabbed him about the face and neck. Powell thought that he had killed Seward, and Powell and Booth had synchronized their efforts to that end. But Seward would survive the assault. A third co-conspirator, George A. Atzerodt, was to murder Vice President Andrew Johnson at the same time as Booth and Powell were attacking their victims, but Atzerodt lost his nerve, got drunk instead, and the vice president escaped harm.

While Lincoln did not die until the following day, 15 April, this episode did not prevent Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and the Army's judge advocate general, Joseph Holt, from moving quickly to capture Booth and round up those persons involved in the assassination of the president and the attempted murder of Seward. Perhaps most importantly, Stanton and Holt decided almost immediately—backed up by a legal opinion from U.S. Attorney General James Speed—that those involved in the assassination conspiracy must be prosecuted by a military commission. The reason for a military commission was because the simultaneous attacks on the president and secretary of state were considered acts of war. Large-scale military operations may have ended by 15 April 1865, but the rebellion of the Southern states against the lawful government was not over, as a matter of law. It followed that Lincoln's murder and the attack on Seward were war crimes and that they should be prosecuted by a military court.

As a result, within days of Lincoln's death, Army lawyers were laying the foundation for the trial by military commission of the seven men and one woman accused of conspiring to murder Lincoln, Seward, and Johnson. These Army judge advocates drafted the charges against the accused, selected the panel of Union officers to hear the case, served as prosecutors in the proceedings, advised the panel on the sufficiency of the evidence and the appropriate sentence, and ensured that those who had been sentenced to death were executed.

Library of Congress

A colored print showing Campbell General Hospital, c. 1864

This article examines the Army's role in the Lincoln assassination trial. It looks at the conspiracy, the conspirators, and the victims. It then discusses the tribunal members, prosecution, and defense counsel, followed by an analysis of the procedures used at a military commission during the Civil War era. Next is an exploration of the trial itself, including the evidence presented, verdicts, and sentences. Finally, this article takes a brief look at the aftermath, and events subsequent to, the trial.

The Conspiracy, the Conspirators, and the Victims

While the conspiracy culminated with Booth firing the bullet that killed Lincoln, Powell stabbing Seward, and Atzerodt's non-attempt to murder Johnson, the conspiracy had not always been about killing the Union's top political leaders. On the contrary, the original plan was to overtake Lincoln's carriage while it was on the way to Campbell General Hospital (the site is located today at Florida Avenue and Seventh Street in northwest Washington) and then kidnap the president. Lincoln made frequent visits to Campbell General Hospital and his whereabouts and travel schedule were common knowledge. The conspirators had spent time observing the president's comings and goings and decided their best chance was to take him during one of his periodic visits to the hospital. The conspirators then intended to take Lincoln to Richmond and hand him over to the Confederate government—the idea being that Lincoln could perhaps be exchanged for Southern prisoners of war being held captive in Northern camps or alternatively used by the Confederate leaders to force the Union into a negotiated peace. Booth, Powell, and Atzerodt were all part of this original kidnapping plan, which they had hoped to carry out on 17 March 1865.

Booth was the best known of the conspirators. Born into a famous acting family, he was renowned for his skills on stage and had a celebrity status akin to a Hollywood star in today's world. Lewis Thornton Powell, known at the time by his alias Lewis Payne, was the most physically imposing of the conspirators. He had served in the Confederate cavalry with the 43d Battalion, Virginia Cavalry, also known as Mosby's Rangers, until 1864. As for Atzerodt, he was a Prussia immigrant and had come to the United States as a young man. Although he was a carriage maker by trade, Atzerodt held Southern sympathies and made his money during the war by ferrying men and materiel for use by the Confederacy across the Potomac River.

Other co-conspirators included Samuel B. Arnold, who had grown up in Baltimore, attended school with Booth, and had served as a Confederate soldier. David E. Herold, a 22 year-old who was the sixth of ten children and came from a relatively prosperous background, was an avid hunter, and knew the geography of southern Maryland. Michael O'Laughlen Jr. (pronounced O-Lock-Len) was another member of the kidnapping conspiracy. Booth and O'Laughlen knew each other from school, and Booth had given rifles, revolvers, knives, belts, and handcuffs to O'Laughlen for safekeeping—and for use in the kidnapping plot.

John H. Surratt Jr., a close friend of Booth's, and John's mother, Mary, were also participants in the plot to seize Lincoln. John Surratt, Confederate spy and courier for most of the war, was much more active in the kidnapping plot than was his mother; although there is no doubt that she knew about the plan and aided the plotters in their quest to kidnap Lincoln. Finally, Samuel A. Mudd, a 32-year-old physician and slave owner, who had met with Booth at least three to four times prior to April 1865 and knew about the kidnapping conspiracy, although the extent of his active involvement is still unclear.

Despite their well-laid plans for seizing Lincoln on 17 March, the kidnapping plot failed for one simple reason: Lincoln changed his mind that day and did not travel to Campbell General Hospital. Less than a month later, however, Booth and his fellow conspirators had transformed their kidnapping conspiracy into a plan to murder Lincoln, Seward, and Johnson. How and why did the plan's metamorphosis occur?

There is little doubt that the decision to abandon kidnapping as the conspiracy's goal and instead attack the Union's senior leaders occurred after Booth heard Lincoln give a speech on 11 April 1865. The president, who increasingly viewed the Civil War as a struggle for freedom, spoke to a group of citizens on the White House lawn about the possible methods by which, now that the rebellion was effectively over, the Southern states would be reconstructed and brought back into


John Wilkes Booth


Lewis T. Powell


George A. Atzerodt


Samuel B. Arnold


David E. Herold


Michael O'Laughlen Jr.


John H. Surratt Jr.


Samuel A. Mudd


Mary Surratt

All images with the exception of Mary Surratt's are courtesy of the Library of Congress. Mary Surratt's image provided courtesy of the National Archives.

the Union. As part of this reconstruction, Lincoln suggested that giving limited civil rights to the newly freed African American slaves was worth considering. Lincoln said that, while slavery had been abolished, more must be done, especially for those black men who had fought for the Union: "It is unsatisfactory to some that the elective franchise is not given to the colored man. I would myself prefer that it were now conferred on the very intelligent, and on those who served our cause as soldiers."[1]

Booth, who was standing with his friend, and co-conspirator, Lewis Powell on the White House lawn, was outraged. Said Booth to Powell: "That means nigger citizenship. Now, by God, I will put him through. That will be the last speech he will ever make."[2] For Booth, it was bad enough that Lincoln had wrecked the country by ending slavery. To now propose enfranchising black men—thereby diluting white power—was anathema. After all, as Booth had put it the year before, "this country was formed for the white not for the black man."[3] Four days later, Lincoln was dead, and it is clear that Booth's motive for murdering the president was his outrage over Lincoln's proposal to give civil rights and political power to African Americans.

Having determined Booth's motivation to assassinate Lincoln, the next issue is the extent to which the other conspirators knew that the conspiracy to kidnap the president was now a murder plan. A reasonable conclusion would be that Herold, Atzerodt, and Powell knew that their conspiracy to kidnap had been transformed. Herold was with Booth when the two men were caught (and Booth was killed) in Virginia. Atzerodt had been tasked with murdering Vice President Johnson, and Powell nearly succeeded in killing Secretary Seward.

Many questions lingered about each conspirator's involvement in the assassination plot. What about Mary Surratt, who ran the boarding house where the conspirators frequently met? Or Dr. Samuel Mudd, who treated the leg Booth had broken when he jumped from Lincoln's box onto the stage at Ford's Theatre? Samuel Arnold, Booth's friend and former classmate? Michael O'Laughlen, to whom Booth had given rifles, revolvers, knives, belts, and handcuffs? Finally, what about the culpability of Edman Spangler, who had not been a part of the kidnapping plot but had held Booth's horse outside Ford's Theatre? Did Spangler know what Booth and his fellow conspirators were plotting?

Library of Congress

Edman Spangler

While most experts agree that Mary Surratt, Mudd, Arnold, and O'Laughlen knew about the conspiracy to kidnap Lincoln, a discussion of the law of conspiracy is germane at this point in discussing responsibility, for it explains why those who denied knowing that there was a plot to assassinate Lincoln nevertheless were criminally liable.

A conspiracy is an agreement by two or more individuals to commit a criminal offense and it requires that at least one of the parties to that agreement commit an act for the purpose of accomplishing that criminal agreement.

There is no legal requirement for all members of the conspiracy to know each other or have any formal words of agreement. As the *Manual for Courts-Martial* explains, "it is sufficient if the minds of the parties arrive at a common understanding to accomplish the object of the conspiracy, *and this may be shown by the conduct of the parties*." [emphasis added][4]

The "overt act" required must be independent of the criminal agreement, but that act need not be criminal. For example, furnishing a car to be used in an upcoming bank robbery would constitute an overt act if the bank robbers were part of a conspiracy.

Perhaps most importantly, because a conspiracy involves shared criminal intent, each conspirator is liable for all offenses committed *pursuant to the conspiracy* by any of the conspirators, even if that conspirator had no knowledge of that offense.

In this regard, those who had joined Booth's conspiracy to kidnap Lincoln were criminally liable for his murder either because they had agreed to assassinate him or else because it was foreseeable that grievous bodily harm, including death, might result from a plot to kidnap the president. For example, if the conspirators had attempted a kidnapping, and one of them had killed a soldier accompanying Lincoln, all would have been guilty of homicide—as it was foreseeable that a guard protecting the president might have been fatally harmed while safeguarding Lincoln. It follows that for Mary Surratt, Samuel Mudd, Samuel Arnold, and Michael O'Laughlen, it was foreseeable that a conspiracy to kidnap the president might result in his death. But even if this legal theory supports the criminal liability of Surratt, Mudd, Arnold, and O'Laughlen, there were additional reasons to believe that Mudd and Surratt, for example, were integral to the murder plot. Although Mudd insisted that he was nothing more or less than a "good country doctor," and denied knowing Booth or anything about his activities, no one believed it was a coincidence that Booth had sought Mudd out to set Booth's broken leg on 15 April 1865.

As for Surratt, her boarding house on H Street in Washington, D.C., had been the locale of the plotters. Most observers agreed with Andrew Johnson, who after becoming president remarked that Surratt had "kept the nest that hatched the rotten egg." Her son, John Surratt was a friend of Booth and part of the conspiracy to kidnap Lincoln. Mary Surratt knew the conspirators and at least knew

that Booth and her son were planning to do harm to the president. Finally, Mary Surratt greatly damaged her own case when she denied knowing Lewis Powell when he was arrested in her presence at the boarding house on 17 April. She is reported to have said: "Before God, sir, I do not know this man, and I have not seen him before."[5] The government later used her denial as evidence that she knew of the conspiracy to murder Lincoln, since it was easily shown at trial that Powell had both visited and boarded with Surratt in the past and that she knew him well.

As for Edman Spangler, who worked as a stagehand and carpenter-handyman at Ford's Theatre, he seems to have been completely unaware of the nature of both the conspiracy and its goals. As the government began rounding up suspects on 15 April 1865, however, no one believed that Spangler could be innocent. On the contrary, the conventional wisdom was that Booth would have entrusted Spangler with his means of escape only if Spangler was part of the murder plot.

A final point, and one that was important to Secretary of War Stanton and Army Judge Advocate General Holt and his prosecution assistants: these men all believed that the murder of Lincoln was the culmination of a "grand conspiracy . . . to destabilize the federal government and the Union war effort."[6] Consequently, while only seven men and one woman actually were tried by military commission for the assassination of Lincoln and the attack on Seward, Holt introduced evidence of this larger conspiracy and conspirators (who were unindicted because they were not on trial). This included testimony about the October 1864 attack on St. Albans, Vermont, where Confederate raiders crossed the border with Canada and robbed three banks of $200,000, and the deaths (either by murder or neglect) of Union prisoners of war at Andersonville, Georgia.

The two most important unindicted co-conspirators were John Surratt and Jefferson Davis, the Confederate president. Surratt was not indicted because he had fled Washington before the assassination. Surratt would evade capture for twenty months, fleeing first to Canada, then to Great Britain, then on to Italy (where he served with the Papal Zouaves), and finally to Egypt, where he was arrested by U.S. agents. Consequently, he would not be prosecuted until 1867. As for Jefferson Davis, Army officials were convinced that the Confederate president either knew about the plot to assassinate Lincoln or had authorized it. On 2 May 1865, ten days before the trial by military commission began, President Andrew Johnson issued a proclamation offering monetary rewards for the capture of Davis and five of Davis' Canadian-based operatives—a proclamation that also suggested that Davis and the Canadian agents had been participants in the assassination. While Davis was in fact captured by Union forces in Georgia on 10 May 1865, and consequently could have been put in the dock with the seven conspirators, he was ultimately not indicted because Stanton and Holt decided to prosecute the Confederate leader for his misdeeds at a later time. However, while Davis remained an "unindicted" conspirator, Holt and his assistant prosecutors did introduce evidence about Davis' misdeeds at the assassination trial.

As to the victims of the conspiracy, it is often forgotten that Lincoln was not the only target of the plotters; the conspirators intended to kill William Seward and Andrew Johnson as well. Consequently, at the moment when Booth was shooting Lincoln, Powell

Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton



Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt

John Surratt Jr. in the uniform of the Papal Zouaves during his flight from justice, c. 1867

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Secretary of State William H. Seward



Attorney General James Speed

Library of Congress

was at Secretary of State Seward's home. Powell may have intended to shoot Seward, but after his revolver misfired during a confrontation with one of Seward's sons, Powell brutally attacked the bedridden secretary of state with a large bowie knife. Powell also stabbed Seward's nurse, a State Department messenger, and Seward's eldest son. Initial reports were that Seward had been killed but, despite a significant loss of blood and serious wounds, Seward lived. Atzerodt's mission was to kill Vice President Johnson in his room at the Kirkwood Hotel in Washington, D.C., but Atzerodt lost his nerve and instead spent the day drinking alcohol and wandering around the city.[7]

It is still unclear if Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant was also an intended victim. Holt and his assistant prosecutors attempted to prove at trial that O'Laughlen had stalked Grant on the night of 13–14 April, and that his mission was to kill him. But the evidence was lacking and, although O'Laughlen was a willing participant in the conspiracy to kidnap Lincoln, if not assassinate him, his involvement in a plot to kill Grant remains unknown.

Trial by Military Commission or Civilian Court?

While Lee had surrendered at Appomattox on 9 April 1865, and Northerners certainly considered the Civil War to be over, in fact there were still nearly 175,000 Confederate soldiers under various commands in the South who had not surrendered. This explains why Secretary of War Stanton and Judge Advocate General Holt were convinced that the assassination was an act of war—an attempt by the Confederacy to accomplish through murder and mayhem what it could not achieve on the field of battle. After all, if the Union's leadership could be eliminated, would this not throw Washington into chaos, and might this persuade those men who took the place of the fallen to pursue a negotiated peace?

In sum, the offenses were military in nature and the conspiracy had the military objective of disrupting the Union Army's operations. Consequently, Stanton and Holt wanted a trial by military commission—and Stanton had already announced that "all persons harboring or secreting the [assassins] . . . or aiding . . . their concealment or escape, will be treated as accomplices in the murder of the President . . . and shall be subject to trial before a military commission and the punishment of death."[8]

Fortunately for Stanton and Holt, Attorney General Speed agreed with them. In a carefully written legal opinion, Speed stated that the following reasons *mandated* a trial by military commission rather than civilian court. First, Lincoln was the Union commander in chief and Washington was ringed by fortifications and protected by Union troops. Second, martial law was in effect at the time of the murder; it had been in existence since 24 September 1862 and, while the civilian courts were open and a civilian police force maintained law and order, the chief police authority in the District was military. Third, the killing of Lincoln and attempted murder of Seward had not been done for personal gain or vengeance but rather to thwart Union military efforts. Fourth, the seven men and one

woman in the conspiracy were not "civilians" but "enemy belligerents." For all these reasons, Speed concluded that "the conspirators" were "public enemies" who "not only can, but ought to be tried before a military tribunal."[9]

While Speed's legal opinion was all that was needed for a military commission to be used, this type of tribunal had other advantages for the prosecution that were most desirable. First, while a civilian criminal proceeding required a unanimous vote for a finding of guilty, a military commission required only that a majority of the panel members concur in a finding of guilty (and the death penalty required only that two-thirds of the members vote for it). Second, many white inhabitants of the District of Columbia were sympathetic to the Confederacy and the institution of slavery. Additionally, many white males who favored the Union were serving in the Army and consequently were not available for jury service (only adult white males were eligible to serve on a jury at this time). All these factors meant that a trial in the District's civilian courts would be problematic, and Stanton and Holt—with good reason—feared jury nullification. The fact is that while Lincoln's death was mourned in the North, more than a few in the South rejoiced upon hearing of his assassination—or at least believed that Lincoln had gotten what he deserved.

Secretary of War Stanton, Judge Advocate General Holt, and President Johnson wanted a military commission because that tribunal could be controlled and justice for Lincoln and the North ensured. Officers in blue uniforms who believed in the Union would hear the case and vote to convict the conspirators. The military commission proceedings would not be reviewed by any civilian court. Finally, there was no appeal from the commission's verdict. Only President Johnson would provide any sort of appellate review; there was no higher military court or appellate court system with jurisdiction over the military commission.

Prosecutors

Judge Advocate General Holt was in charge of the overall prosecution effort. An experienced lawyer and trial attorney, he was widely known and respected for his advocacy skills. Although hailing from the border state of Kentucky, he was "a strong Union man" and fervent supporter of Abraham Lincoln. Holt had considerable experience in Washington, D.C., as he had served as both postmaster general and secretary of war in the Buchanan administration. After Congress created the position of judge advocate general in July 1862, Lincoln appointed Holt to the new position with the rank and pay of a colonel. Two years later, Holt had been promoted to brigadier general and the head of the Army's Bureau of Military Justice.[10]

Holt was ably assisted in prosecuting the conspirators by Ohio Congressman John A. Bingham, who served as special judge advocate before the commissioners. While Holt worked behind the scenes, and liaised with Stanton, it was Bingham who examined the witnesses and made the final summation.[11]

The third member of the prosecution team was Col. Henry L. Burnett, who served as assistant judge advocate. While he had only been a lawyer since 1860, Burnett had served as the judge advocate of the Department of Ohio since 1863, and achieved a measure of fame trying Southern sympathizers at military commissions. His successful prosecution in Ohio of the high-profile military commission that tried the Copperhead agitator Clement Vallandingham made Burnett the logical choice to join the Holt-Bingham prosecution team. After the trial, Burnett helped prepare the official account of the proceedings, which was published as *The Assassination of President Lincoln and Trial of the Conspirators*.[12]

The prosecution team, seated left to right: Congressman Bingham, Judge Advocate General Holt, and Colonel Burnett

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Defense Counsel

Each of the conspirators had a defense counsel—either privately retained or appointed by the government.

Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson was the best known, and he was assisted in his defense of Mary Surratt by his junior partners Frederick Aiken and John Clampitt.

Bvt. Maj. Gen. Thomas Ewing was counsel for Samuel Arnold, Samuel Mudd, and Edman Spangler. Bvt. Brig. Gen. William Doster (he had risen to lieutenant colonel during the war but was brevetted brigadier general for "gallant and meritorious service") was appointed by the military commission to serve as counsel for George Atzerodt and Lewis Powell.

Walter S. Cox provided defense advice to Michael O'Laughlen, and Frederick Stone was counsel for David Herold.

Panel Members

The Union officers chosen to sit in judgment of the conspirators were selected by John Bingham, the assistant prosecutor—undoubtedly in consultation with and assistance from Judge Advocate General Holt and Secretary of War Stanton.

Maj. Gen. David A. Hunter was the president of the commission. Joining him were Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Harris, Brig. Gen. Albion Howe, Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace (perhaps better known today as the author of the novel *Ben-Hur*), Maj. Gen. August V. Kautz, and Brig. Gen. Robert S. Foster.[13] Brig. Gen. James A. Ekin, Lt. Col. David R. Clendenin, and Col. Charles H. Tompkins rounded out the panel. All were Union Army combat veterans and all presumably were outraged by the murder of their commander in chief.

Trial Procedure

While the prosecution understood that the military commission favored its efforts, this does not mean that the procedures followed in the Lincoln assassination trial were different from the procedure generally followed in civilian courts. On the contrary, the military trial closely followed civilian court procedure.

While there were no codified rules of evidence, the prosecution and defense did lodge objections with the court. Special Judge Advocate John Bingham made thirty-four objections and the defense counsels made fifteen objections. But while all the prosecution's objections were sustained, the commission sustained only two made by the defense.

There are a few other procedural points worth considering. In accordance with the prevailing view in U.S. courts, the accused was not permitted to testify, the view being that any testimony, even if under oath, would be self-serving. Additionally, the military commission had no judge and there were no rules of evidence; the members of the commission decided what they would or would not hear; any evidence that a reasonable person thought was relevant was admissible. Perhaps most importantly, there was no "presumption of innocence"; it seems likely that the Union officers who heard the case in fact presumed that the conspirators were guilty as charged. Finally, Holt and Bingham were active participants in the commission's deliberations. However, they did not get to vote on the issue of guilt or on the sentence.

Trial Evidence

The commission convened every day at 10 a.m., and the first order of business was to read the previous day's testimony in open court. While the defense counsel suggested that this time-consuming process be stopped, Holt was adamant that the record of trial be read publicly in its entirety to give both sides the opportunity to make any objections and offer corrections to the record. Both sides did raise some minor objections, of which a few were sustained, and corrections to the record were made.

While trial by military commission had been ordered on 1 May, the trial did not begin until 10 May and began with the defense counsel attacking the jurisdiction of the tribunal and moving to dismiss the proceedings. Senator Johnson and General Ewing insisted that the commission could not try civilians who had no connection to the war because the civilian courts were open and functioning. The commission denied the defense motion.

General Ewing, the defense counsel for Samuel Mudd, then asked for his client to be tried separately from the other conspirators on the grounds that his defense would be "greatly prejudiced by a joint trial."[14] This motion also was denied.

As evidence began to be presented, Bingham first sought to prove the involvement of Confederate leaders in the assassination. The government's three chief witnesses—Richard Montgomery, James Merritt, and Sanford Conover—claimed to have been in Canada and privy to discussions there

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Senator Reverdy Johnson

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Portrait of the military commission that tried and convicted the Lincoln conspirators. Standing left to right: General Harris, General Wallace, General Kautz, and Colonel Burnett. Seated left to right: Colonel Clendenin, Colonel Tompkins, General Howe, General Ekin, General Hunter, General Foster, Congressman Bingham, and General Holt.

An 1865 sketch showing the courtroom during the trial of the conspirators

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about assigning Confederate agents to murder Lincoln. In fact, Merritt caused a sensation in court when he testified that he had not only seen Booth, Powell, and Herold in Canada but also knew that Jefferson Davis had authorized the killing *in writing*.[15]

However, no sooner had Montgomery, Merritt, and Conover testified than their statements were revealed as false, making them perjurers. Evidence was presented that the men had in fact not been in Canada at the times and places they claimed and that they had fabricated stories about meeting with Confederate agents involved in a plot to assassinate Lincoln. Although the public, as well as Holt, Bingham, and Burnett, continued to believe that the Confederacy's leadership had been involved in the assassination conspiracy, the problematic testimony of Montgomery, Merritt, and Conover caused the prosecution to focus its efforts on the defendants themselves. Even still, evidence about mistreatment of Union prisoners of war at Andersonville, the bank robbery in St. Albans, Vermont, and other crimes were also presented.

As the trial proceeded, the guilt of Lewis Powell became incontrovertible, as witness after witness appeared and identified him as the man who had brutally attacked Seward. Powell's defense counsel consequently argued that he was simply a rebel soldier carrying out his duty and that he should not be found guilty for doing his duty.

David Herold's guilt also was clear, since he had been with Booth when the latter was killed. His defense attorney, however, argued that Herold was a coward and had only accompanied Booth as a guide.

The government's evidence of George Atzerodt's involvement in the conspiracy—and his mission to kill then–Vice President Johnson—was strong. Consequently, his defense counsel argued that he, too, was a coward who had never intended to do harm. The problem for the defense was that the commission members knew that Lincoln would still be alive if Atzerodt had gone to the proper authorities earlier in the day on 14 April and revealed the conspiracy.

The proof of Samuel Arnold and Michael O'Laughlen's involvement in the kidnapping plot was sufficient to convince the panel that they also must have known about the decision to kill Lincoln, Seward, and Johnson. In any event, Arnold and O'Laughlen were guilty on a theory of vicarious liability.

While the evidence of Mary Surratt's knowledge of the assassination conspiracy was circumstantial, she had badly damaged her case by denying that she recognized Lewis Powell on the night of her arrest. The government also showed that she was involved in carrying messages to fellow conspirators. But the most damning evidence was the fact that her son, John Surratt, was a confidant of Booth and a key participant in the kidnapping conspiracy.

Like Mary Surratt, Samuel Mudd also had wounded his own interests by repeatedly lying to the authorities about his relationship with Booth and the other conspirators—even when given the chance to change his story and come clean. It was no coincidence that Booth had come to Mudd for medical treatment. More importantly, as historian Edward Steers Jr. wrote in his authoritative volume *Blood on the Moon: The Assassination of Abraham Lincoln*, the prevailing view was that "innocent men do not withhold the truth or mislead. Mudd did both and the government easily dismissed his claims of innocence."[16]

The weakest evidence involved Edman Spangler. While there was no proof of his participation in the conspiracy, much less knowledge of it, the commission president, General Hunter, and his fellow commissioners simply did not believe that Booth could have escaped without a plan for doing so—and since Spangler had provided these means, he was guilty as well.



President Andrew Johnson

Portrait of the civilian jury for the 1867 trial of John Surratt

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When the trial ended after fifty days, the commission had heard 366 witnesses and listened to the reading of a 4,900-page transcript. There had been roughly the same number of witnesses for both the prosecution and defense.

Verdict and Sentence

On 6 July 1865, Atzerodt, Herold, Powell, and Mary Surratt were found guilty and sentenced to be hanged by the neck until dead. Arnold, Mudd, and O'Laughlen were sentenced to life imprisonment. Spangler received six years in jail.

The four condemned conspirators were hanged on 7 July 1865. Mary Surratt's supporters believed that she would be spared the noose, and the members of the military commission had recommended clemency for her. However, President Johnson approved her death sentence, although he later claimed ignorance of the clemency petition and blamed Judge Advocate General Holt for withholding it.

Arnold, Mudd, and O'Laughlen were shipped to Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas, about seventy miles west of Key West, Florida, to serve their sentence.

O'Laughlen died in prison in 1867 of yellow fever. Mudd and Arnold were pardoned by President Johnson and released in 1869. Mudd died in 1883 at the age of 49; Arnold died in 1906 at the age of 72.

Aftermath

In 1866, the Supreme Court ruled in *Ex parte Milligan* that a defendant could not be tried by military commission when the civilian courts were open and functioning—thus signaling that the defense counsel who argued against the jurisdiction of the commission in the Lincoln assassination trial were legally correct. It was, however, too late for their clients.

The following year, John Surratt was prosecuted in District Court in Washington for his involvement in the assassination. Surratt admitted his involvement in the plot to kidnap the president but denied knowing anything about Booth's murder plot. It was a very clever defense and the jury deadlocked (eight for not guilty; four for guilty). Faced with a "hung jury," the judge declared a mistrial. Shortly thereafter, Surratt was released; he was never retried. Many experts believe that a key factor in the jury's refusal to convict him was their sympathy for his mother—who had the unwanted distinction of being the first woman in history to have been executed by the U.S. government. Consequently, while his mother had been hanged, Surratt escaped the gallows and lived to be 72 years old, dying in 1916.[17]

Preparing to execute Mary Surratt, Lewis Powell, David Herold, and George Atzerodt, on the grounds of the Washington Arsenal (the modern-day location of Fort Lesley J. McNair), 7 July 1865

Library of Congress

In the summer of 1865, however, the vast majority of Northerners agreed with Secretary of War Stanton's 20 April 1865 statement that "the stain of innocent blood be removed from the land by the arrest and punishment of the murderers."[18] They also agreed with him that the conspirators were guilty of a horrific crime and had deserved the ultimate penalty.

While the trial of the conspirators by military commission may have been an appropriate forum, it was not fair by contemporary standards. The accused were guilty but most certainly did not receive a fair trial. And Mary Surratt, while guilty, should not have been hanged. The punishment for Mary's involvement in the conspiracy was excessive when compared to the punishment for Booth, Herold, Powell, and Atzerodt. After her death, many were shocked that a woman had been hanged, an act which garnered much public sympathy for her plight. This act, now considered a political disaster, tainted the public's opinion about the validity of the proceedings.

Appendix

Chronology

A timeline showing the assassination's place in larger events—and the dates between the murder, the arrest of the conspirators, and their trial and execution—is helpful in revealing how the entire process was moved quickly by modern standards.

March 1865

4: Abraham Lincoln's second inauguration

April

3: Richmond falls

9: Robert E. Lee surrenders at Appomattox Court House

14: Fort Sumter re-occupied (a.m.)

14: Lincoln shot (p.m.)

15: Lincoln dies

15: Edman Spangler arrested

17: Lewis Powell arrested at Mary Surratt's boarding house

17: Samuel Arnold arrested

17: Michael O'Laughlen Jr. surrenders to authorities

19: Lincoln's funeral in White House

20: George Atzerodt arrested

24: Samuel Mudd arrested

26: David Herold arrested

26: John Wilkes Booth shot dead in burning barn

May

1: President Andrew Johnson orders conspirators tried at military commission

9: Conspirators read charges

10: Trial starts

12: First testimony

June

29: Commission goes into secret deliberations

July

5: Verdicts and sentence delivered to Johnson

The sentences have been carried out. Note the coffins and graves to the right of the scaffold

6: Defendants learn verdict and sentence

7: Four conspirators (Atzerodt, Herold, Powell, and Surratt) hanged

Notes

1. Edward Steers Jr., *Blood on the Moon: The Assassination of Abraham Lincoln* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), p. 91.

2. Ibid., p. 177.

3. Ibid., p. 9.

4. *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 2008*, part IV–5, para. 5.c.(2). The law as it existed in 1865 differed little from today's law of conspiracy.

5. Steers, *Blood on the Moon,* p. 177.

6. Elizabeth D. Leonard, *Lincoln's Avengers: Justice, Revenge, and Reunion After the Civil War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), p. 82.

7. Steers, *Blood on the Moon,* pp. 166–68.

8. A reward poster was issued by the War Department, Washington, D.C., dated 20 April 1865, for the capture of President Lincoln's assassins: John Surratt, John Wilkes Booth, and David E. Herold.

9. Attorney General James Speed, *Opinion on the Constitutional Power of the Military to Try and Execute the Assassins of the President* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1865); "Order Establishing a Military Commission to Try the Lincoln Assassination Conspirators and the Opinion of the Attorney General Affirming the Legality of Using a Military Commission to Try the Conspirators," posted at http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/lincolnconspiracy/commissionorder.html (accessed 14 Jun 2012).

10. For more on Joseph Holt, see Joshua E. Kastenberg, *Law in War, War as Law: Brigadier General Joseph Holt and the Judge Advocate General's Department in the Civil War and Early Reconstruction, 1861–1865* (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2011); Elizabeth D. Leonard, *Lincoln's Forgotten Ally: Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt of Kentucky* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Darrell Baugh, "Soldier: Major General Joseph Holt," *On Point* (Winter 2009): 18–20.

11. John Bingham was the principal author of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, considered by both historians and lawyers to be one of the most important amendments because it was used by the Supreme Court to apply most of the Bill of Rights to state action.

12. For more on Henry Burnett, see "Henry Burnett's Law Career," posted at www.iment.com/maida/familytree/burnett/lawcareer.htm (accessed 20 Jul 2009); Benn Pitman, *The Assassination of President Lincoln and the Trial of the Conspirators* (Cincinnati, Ohio: Moore, Wilstach & Baldwin, 1865).

13. Lew Wallace, *Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1880).

14. Steers, *Blood on the Moon,* p. 222.

15. Ibid., p. 124.

16. Ibid., pp. 226–27.

17. For a thorough examination of John Surratt's role in the assassination, see Andrew C. A. Jampoler, *The Last Lincoln Conspirator: John Surratt's Flight from the Gallows* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008).

18. Reward poster issued by the War Department, Washington, D.C., dated 20 April 1865, for the capture of President Lincoln's assassins.

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U.S. Army Artifact Spotlight

"As a Token of Esteem and Respect"

Presentation-Grade Sword Given to 1st Lt. Oscar D. McMillan, U.S. Army, 1865

By Dieter Stenger

On 23–24 May 1865, as the Grand Armies of the Republic passed in review from the Capitol down Pennsylvania Avenue, Union Army 1st Lt. Oscar D. McMillan was in obscure Hedgesville, West Virginia, eight-five miles northwest of the events taking place in the nation's capital. Amid the monotony of camp life, he wrote to his sister, imaging the spectacle of the Grand Review: "I suppose it was a magnificent sight, there is something so exhilarating in the thought of marching home as conquerors after four years of war and strife."

McMillan's men—Company C of the 1st Potomac Home Brigade, Maryland Cavalry—began to muster out the very next day, but not before having given McMillan a token of their appreciation. Days earlier, they gave him a sash, belt, and a magnificent engraved and inscribed sword. Later donated by the McMillan family to the U.S. Army—as part of a larger collection associated with Oscar McMillan—the sword today is part of the Army's core collection held at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

The heavily ornamented sword resembles the Model 1850 Staff and Field Officer's Sword. Its hilt has a gilded brass knuckle-bow with floral designs and the ciphers "U.S." Its silver-plated brass grip features a standing figure of liberty wielding a sword and a shield. The quillon forms into a handsome American eagle's head. The pommel, shaped as a Phrygian helmet, is decorated with floral sprays and an American eagle with upswept wings clutching an escutcheon. The pommel rim is surrounded by small ruby-red stones.

The McMillan sword's German-made blade is etched and gilt-washed on both sides. The ricasso is marked "W./CLAUBERG/SOLINGEN." Although Victorian in date, the blade etchings retain patriotic emblems of the Federal period, such as a circle of stars, the American eagle atop an escutcheon superimposed on an anchor, and floral panoplies. There also are two flags, a bugle, two drums, and a shield. The reverse of the blade features a panel with the motto "Always Ready," and "U.S." in large letters.

The silver-plated scabbard is fitted with heavy furnishings depicting floral designs and stands of arms. The drag features a standing uniformed Union soldier. The reverse sides are delicately engraved with floral designs. The scabbard throat, or upper band, bears the following inscription: "Presented to /1st LIEUT. OSCAR D. McMILLAN/BY/the members of/ Comp'y. C/Cole's Md. Cavalry/As a token of/ esteem and/respect."

Dieter Stenger joined the Center of Military History in February 2006 as a curator assigned to the Collections Branch of Museum Division. He is currently serving at the Museum Support Center, at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, as the curator of firearms and edged weapons.

National Museum of the U.S. Army

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Maj. Wilson C. Blythe Jr. is currently a small group leader at the Field Artillery Captains' Career Course. After graduating in 2001 from the University of Mississippi with a bachelor's degree in history, he became a field artillery officer in the U.S. Army. His service includes deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. He holds a master's degree in history from Eastern Michigan University. He is currently pursuing his Ph.D. in military history at the University of North Texas, where he is writing a dissertation on the development of AirLand Battle.

Frontier Army Museum

Portrait of *Arthur L. Wagner,* date and artist unknown

ARTHUR L. WAGNER
MILITARY EDUCATOR AND MODERNIZER

By Wilson C. Blythe Jr.

Barth Hall c. 1885 was the home to the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry from its founding in 1881 until 1890./Fort Leavenworth Public Affairs Office

The late nineteenth century is generally accepted as a period marked by the increased modernization and professionalism of Western militaries. Studies of the United States Army's efforts during this time have focused on the work of Emory Upton and have largely overlooked the role of other reformers, most notably Arthur Lockwood Wagner. Wagner was critical to the evolution of the United States Army during this era because of his influence in military education, his role in planning the war with Spain and leading the Military Information Division, and finally his legacy of lesson-learning.

Wagner is most closely associated with the development of the military education system, especially the Army schools that operated under various names at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He first joined the faculty of Leavenworth's Infantry and Cavalry School in 1886 on the request of Col. Alexander McCook after Wagner's regiment, the 6th Infantry, redeployed to Leavenworth from Fort Douglas, Utah. Altogether, between 1886 and 1903, Wagner would serve eleven years at Fort Leavenworth as assistant instructor, senior instructor, and assistant commandant. Half of Wagner's thirty-year military career involved some aspect of military education. In addition to his time at the Leavenworth schools, Wagner was also integral to the reform of the Army education system following the Spanish-American War, and at the time of his death was the director of the nascent Army War College.[1]

Despite holding a relatively modest rank for most of his career, and only promoted to brigadier general in 1905, Wagner became very influential within the Army. This highly intellectual officer, who ironically graduated near the bottom of his United States Military Academy class of 1875, first achieved renown with the officer corps when his essay "The Military Necessities of the United States and the Best Provisions for Meeting Them" won the gold medal from the Military Service Institution of the United States in 1884. Wagner's long tenure on the faculty at Leavenworth and prolific pen gave him much greater influence than many of his senior officers. He authored numerous articles in the professional journals of his day and several books on military subjects, which literally became the textbooks in the Army's schools. By the 1890s, Wagner had become one of the Army's leading thinkers.[2]

The institution Wagner is most closely associated with, the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry, was one of the postgraduate military schools founded by General William Tecumseh Sherman. Established in 1881, the school, located at Fort Leavenworth, was ambiguous in its purpose. Sherman wanted Leavenworth to become the centerpiece of the Army's emerging system of postgraduate military schools. Despite this ambitious goal, the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry initially found itself preoccupied with correcting the educational deficiencies of recently commissioned officers. These inadequacies encompassed not only military questions, such as training in basic small-unit tactics, but also instruction in common school subjects, such as reading and mathematics. This initial focus on remedial training, which was designed to meet the immediate needs of an expanded force, greatly detracted from the school's intended

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role of preparing officers for higher command and staff positions.[3]

Despite its inauspicious beginnings, by the 1890s the Infantry and Cavalry School was the backbone of the Army's officer educational system and was critical to the cohesion of its geographically dispersed officer corps around a shared professional identity. It was Arthur L. Wagner who became the main figure in the evolution of the Infantry and Cavalry School from an institution that was contemptuously referred to as "the kindergarten" into the Army's educational and intellectual hub. This intellectually inclined officer was a strong proponent of the idea that the peacetime Army should serve as a school for officers, training and educating them in preparation for their wartime duties. Wagner sought to transform the Army's educational system into something comparable to that of the German Army's, which he greatly admired. The Prussians had successfully shown that reforming an army's educational system could be the catalyst to greater reforms.[4]

In order to have the desired impact on the Army's professionalism, Leavenworth first had to gain credit within the Army by producing graduates who were recognized experts in the art of war. Wagner was the leading figure in reforming the Leavenworth school and publicizing the school's progress in professional journals such as the *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*. He wrote one piece, "An American War College," with the specific intent of comparing the school to the German educational system in order to gain credibility by comparison. In another, he engaged in a lively debate with a detractor of the school. Through these two articles, along with excerpts from his other published works, it is possible to gain an appreciation for Wagner's views on the Army's educational system and Leavenworth in particular.[5]

Wagner recognized that the requirement to provide remedial instruction to academically deficient officers in common school subjects was a major obstacle to the Infantry and Cavalry School's path to credibility within the Army. He questioned the wisdom in retaining such officers in a profession that was increasingly affected by technological advances and required more self-study to keep current on the latest innovations in warfare. To allow the school to focus on postgraduate studies, in 1889 Wagner advocated eliminating all remedial work at the school, which was achieved during Col. Hamilton S. Hawkins' tenure as commandant (1894–1898). Additionally, Wagner proposed either barring officers who failed the Leavenworth course from further promotion or discharging them from the service. This was a result of a series of incidents in which officers who did not pass muster at the Infantry and Cavalry School were promoted almost immediately upon leaving the school and thus given the impression of being rewarded for their failure. For those officers and potential officers who were lacking academically, Wagner proposed the creation of a separate preparatory school to conduct remedial training while the students were on probationary status. His advocacy also resulted in the institution of a system of required examinations for promotion in order to weed out unqualified officers. As originally proposed by Wagner, this system would have the caveat that a diploma from the Infantry and Cavalry School was suitable proof of an officer's fitness to be promoted to captain.[6]

In addition to changing to a more academically rigorous curriculum by discarding remedial training, Wagner proposed altering the method of selecting instructors for the school. With the exception of the instructors in the Department of Engineering and

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Top: Emory Upton, shown here as a major general, c. 1865
Center: Alexander McCook, shown here as a major general, c. 1865
Right: General Sherman, c. 1888

National Archives

Col. Hamilton S. Hawkins, c. 1898



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The Prussian War Academy in Berlin, c. 1900

the Department of Military Hygiene, the remainder of the positions were drawn from the various units assigned to the Fort Leavenworth garrison. This greatly limited the pool from which instructors could be drawn and virtually ensured that the Leavenworth school was deprived of the talents of the best and the brightest of the officer corps. Wagner endorsed the idea of expanding the pool of potential instructors by having the commanding general of the United States Army select officers for detached service to the Infantry and Cavalry School on the basis of the recommendation of the commandant of the school. Under Wagner's plan, the selected officers would serve as instructors for a period of not less than four years and would be given pay and allowances comparable to an assistant professor at the United States Military Academy. In 1895, the selection process for instructors was changed to a process similar to that championed by Wagner.[7]

One of the most important benefits of the Infantry and Cavalry School, according to Wagner, was its ability to increase the quality of the officers in the National Guard and promote uniformity between the separate state formations and the Regular Army. As he pointed out, any future war in which the United States was involved, like those of the past, would be fought by an army that consisted of a large number of guard or volunteer soldiers for which the Regular Army would serve as a cadre. Thus, it made sense to expand the number of Regular Army students from one officer in each class to two for each of the thirty-five out of the forty regiments that sent students to Leavenworth.[8] In addition to increasing the number of regular officers who would attend the school and in wartime serve as a cadre for an expanded army, Wagner advocated creating additional slots at the Infantry and Cavalry School for officers of the National Guard. He believed that increasing the knowledge base of National Guard officers would be far more successful in raising that organization's effectiveness than the current policy of sending regular officers on temporary duty to state encampments. Wagner believed that this policy would be of considerable value in negating the less desirable effects of the nation's reliance on minimally trained state formations, which he had detailed in "The Military and Naval Policy of the United States," and additionally would further increase the importance of schools like Leavenworth to its military system.[9]

Based on his study of European military institutions and a visit to the Prussian War Academy, Wagner composed a piece comparing the curriculum of the Infantry and Cavalry School to that of the schools that comprised the German military educational system. Wagner made it clear that the increasing size and complexity of warfare made it so that a cadet school, such as the United States Military Academy, was no longer sufficient for the education of an officer. He believed that with the elimination of the requirement to provide remedial instruction, the Leavenworth school now provided a close approximation of the War Academy in Berlin. While Wagner's comparison was flawed in that it overlooked the process of selecting officers in the German Army, he did successfully make the case that the Infantry and Cavalry School had become a respectable postgraduate military institution. The officers who graduated from Leavenworth also had the requirement of preparing a thesis on some military subject. Its graduates were qualified for the myriad tasks a line officer could be expected to perform in time of war. A large part of this was due to the school's flagship department, the Department of Military Art, and the content and methodology it used.[10]

Perhaps Wagner's greatest contribution to Army education was the introduction of the applicatory method of instruction at Fort Leavenworth. Wagner began utilizing the applica-

tory method during the 1893–1894 term, one year before succeeding Lt. Col. Jacob Kline as head of the Department of Military Art. Until that time, the course had relied on rote memorization, a few simplistic map exercises, and sham battles to teach the student officers. Wagner's approach required the students to become active participants rather than passive listeners. He stressed decision making and sound judgment rather than purely academic achievement.[11]

Around 1820, the great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz proposed utilizing the applicatory method of tactical instruction at the War Academy. However, the applicatory method would not be fully integrated into the curriculum at the academy until the 1860s. By the time, Wagner was exposed to the applicatory method, during his trip to Europe to research his first book *The Campaign of Koniggratz: A Study of the Austro-Prussian Conflict in Light of the American Civil War* (Leavenworth, Kans., 1889), it had been used by the German Army for thirty years. His visit to the Prussian War Academy introduced him to the applicatory method of tactical instruction that he brought to the U.S. Army and is still in use at Fort Leavenworth today.[12]

The applicatory method employed an analytical approach to the study of tactics and relied heavily on practical work. This tactical problem solving normally involved the student preparing and issuing orders as they would during actual operations and could take the form of map problems, map maneuvers, tactical rides, and exercises with troops. The students were taught a principle or technique in a classroom setting, typically a lecture, to be followed by a tactical problem whose solution required them to correctly employ what they had just learned.[13]

While it is true that the school had used practical work in the past, under Wagner's leadership it was much more effective and formed a large part of the curriculum. Students were now required to issue a solution to the problem in the form of written orders

Frontier Army Museum

Eben Swift, shown here as a major general, c. 1918

rather than provide a mere explanation of the situation as was previously required. During the tactical problems, students were forced to deal with issues such as time-distance factors, basic troop leading procedures, and reverse or backward planning while developing orders for tactical tasks such as reconnaissance and screening. A large map was used for problems that entailed larger formations, and the officers would produce orders covering their command's scheme of maneuver, including specific instructions for the advance guard. Each subdivision of the notional army had a student designated as the commander who would create orders for his sphere of command.[14]

Tactical exercises in the field were focused on minor tactics and gave junior company-grade officers, who while on duty with their regiment would likely never have commanded anything larger than a platoon, the opportunity to command larger formations such as a regiment of infantry or a squadron of cavalry. The troops were drawn from the Fort Leavenworth garrison, which consisted of the 20th Infantry and a squadron of the 6th Cavalry. The student officers were given the rare and valuable opportunity to lead these large bodies of troops on tactical marches and to prepare them to conduct an attack and a defense. During these exercises, the students were only informed of the tactical situation after assuming their commands and were not given any information that they could not reasonably have been expected to acquire through reconnaissance. The opposing forces used blank cartridges, and the faculty would serve as umpire to decide the outcome of engagements. These exercises were highly beneficial to the development of the officers involved despite the formations occasionally not being at full strength. By providing the student officers the opportunity to practice tactical decision making, it increased their tactical acumen and gave them invaluable experience with handling larger formations, which helped prepare them for higher-echelon command.[15]

Wagner's efforts led to the Leavenworth school being the first military institution in the United States to adopt an organized program of practical instruction in minor tactics. The applicatory method was his greatest contribution to the Army's program of postgraduate education, and his Department of Military Art served as the nucleus around which Leavenworth was organized until the First World War. The influence of Wagner's applicatory method would go beyond Leavenworth when his assistant Eben Swift brought the system to the Army War College, where he served from 1907–1910. The need for additional map exercises for Wagner's department led the faculty to create its own map exercises rather than relying on European imports. The tactical problems generated at Leavenworth were based on the Army's own campaigns and conditions prevalent in North America and contributed to the Americanization of military education at Leavenworth. Wagner's use of the applicatory technique of instruction foreshadowed later theories of adult education, particularly the work of Peter Jarvis who espoused a similar theory in 1987.[16]

As the Department of Military Art's curriculum grew more sophisticated, Wagner began to incorporate increasing amounts of historical and

Military History Institute

Wagner, shown here as a lieutenant colonel, c. 1900

theoretical work into his course. During this period, works on military art were largely produced in German and inaccessible to the bulk of the officer corps of the U.S. Army. Wagner's books and articles became the conduit through which most Army officers were exposed to the latest European ideas. He did not merely regurgitate the ideas of better-known European theorists such as Prince Hohenlohe or Colmar von der Goltz but took their ideas and critiqued them in the light of the U.S. Army's organization and unique heritage.[17]

Recognizing that there were no textbooks on military art available that emphasized the military experience of the United States, Wagner took it upon himself to write them. His writings were an important contribution to the increased professionalization of the U.S. Army and the Americanization of the study of military art and history in the Army's schools. However, Wagner did not seek to discard the European military experience; he believed that the methods of war in Europe and America were similar and merely sought the most incisive military lessons.[18]

In *The Campaign of Koniggratz*, he examines that campaign from the Austro-Prussian War and compares it to the lessons of the American Civil War. While Wagner did not argue for the tactical superiority of either the Europeans or Americans, he did argue that the belligerents could have learned valuable lessons if they had studied the actions of the United States Army. In particular, he pointed out that the Austrians made no use of hasty entrenchments, an expedient that was used to a considerable extent during the American Civil War.[19]

The Service of Security and Information (Washington, D.C., 1893) and *Organization and Tactics* (New York, 1895) were both written by Wagner expressly to serve as textbooks at Leavenworth. *Service of Security and Information* detailed the purpose and function of an army's reconnaissance elements and taught that safeguarding information about one's own side while gaining the information about the enemy were the most basic of tactical tasks. Throughout the work, Wagner refused to give authoritative pronouncements and instead stressed the uniqueness of each situation and that officers had to be flexible.[20]

Organization and Tactics discussed the employment of all arms in the attack and defense. Wagner's work stressed the importance of offensive action in order to gain a decision on the battlefield. However, he was not a believer in the cult of the offensive; he recognized that technological advances such as the increased range and improved accuracy of contemporary weapons had strengthened the defense to a disproportionate extent. *Organization and Tactics* stressed that attacks needed to be well led, planned according to the local conditions, and preferably hit a flank or other enemy weak point in order to succeed.[21]

Wagner's books employed historical examples throughout to illustrate his arguments on tactical matters. For example, in *Organization and Tactics* he used a quarter of the book to detail the evolution of the tactics of each arm during the preceding century in order to strengthen his argument for the trend to greater dispersion on the battlefield and the need for an extended order. Wagner's books would remain in use at Leavenworth until the eve of the First World War and ensured that the Leavenworth schools would be capable of studying the art and science of war under the light of its nation's military experience.[22]

Wagner continued to play an important role in Army education even after he left the Leavenworth faculty. In January 1904, then-Col. Arthur L. Wagner was made chief of the Third Division of the Army's new General Staff where one of his primary tasks was to conduct a comprehensive plan for the system of Army schools established by the progressive-minded Secretary of War Elihu Root. The Army's educational system now consisted of an ascending ladder of schools ranging from its cadet school, the United States Military Academy at the bottom, to the recently established Army War College at the top.[23]

The Third Division had much work to do in order to both integrate the Army's expanded suite of schools and to return the Leavenworth schools to their prior state of effectiveness. The Leavenworth schools had been closed from April 1898, when the War Department ordered students and instructors to their regiments for the Spanish-American War, until it reopened on 1 September 1902. After reopening, and until 1904, the Leavenworth schools reverted to a one-year

Secretary Root, c. 1903

Library of Congress

course concentrating on remedial training in basic military subjects for untrained junior officers. While it may have been gratifying that the curriculum at Leavenworth was based largely on his works, Wagner could not have been pleased to see the school revert to its initial focus of providing elementary instruction in military subjects.[24]

In May 1904, Wagner prepared a draft order concerning the Army's educational system that radically altered education at Leavenworth. Wagner's plan integrated the Army's schools into a coherent whole. Each school focused on a different part of military art: tactics, staff organization and operations, and strategy. The Army War College would have the additional task of supervising the lower-level schools.

The two-year course that had existed before the war with Spain was brought back at Leavenworth; however, Wagner altered the organization of the school. He split the two-year course into two separate schools. The first-year course was the Infantry and Cavalry School whose honor and distinguished graduates would matriculate to the second-year course, which was the new Army Staff College. Additionally, the classes would be staggered with the schools receiving a new group of students each year rather than every other year as was common before the Spanish-American War. In this manner, more officers would be afforded the opportunity for a Leavenworth education, and the chance to distinguish oneself through selection to attend the Army Staff College would act as a spur to greater achievement in the course.[25]

Wagner's creation of the new Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and integration of all the Army's schools was a bold reform. He gave the Army a coherent educational program consisting of an Infantry and Cavalry School that focused on the study of applied tactics, a true Staff College that could supply trained officers for the Army's General Staff and study what is referred to today as the operational level of war, and finally a War College that would train senior leaders as strategists. Wagner was further able to shape the direction of each school because of the role he played in developing each school's curriculum from his post on the General Staff. The basic organization and sphere of responsibility for the Army's schools remains much the same today as it was when first developed in 1904 by Wagner.[26]

Though he is mainly thought of as a reformer and modernizer in the realm of military education, Wagner also had a direct impact on the evolution of military intelligence and the Army's transition to a modern general staff. In 1896, Wagner was placed in charge of the Army's nascent intelligence agency. Established in 1885 and variously called the Military Information Division (MID), Bureau, or Section, this part of the Adjutant General's Office was responsible for collecting and evaluating intelligence.[27]

Wagner expanded the MID's ability to stay abreast of foreign military developments and gather intelligence by adding military attachés to the Tokyo, Berlin, and Istanbul embassies. The MID began to focus its collection efforts on Spanish forces in the Caribbean, and in this endeavor, it employed State Department sources such as the various consulates, travelers, businessmen returning from the region, the military attaché in Madrid, and American volunteers with the Cuban rebels. Despite not being allowed to send agents to Cuba until war was declared, Wagner's office was able to accurately predict enemy troop numbers to within two thousand men of the official Spanish number, as well as the composition and disposition of Spanish forces in Cuba by 1897. The MID also had a cartographic function, and prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it published and distributed maps of Spain's possessions in the Caribbean, including the plans for Havana's fortifications. Wagner's success in laying the basis for rational military planning led to his office being placed in charge of preparing the Army's plans for mobilization and war with Spain. In effect, the MID under Wagner acted as a European-style general staff in miniature.[28]

Because of the growing influence of the MID over preparations for the war with Spain, it was perhaps inevitable that Wagner would be appointed to serve as the Army's representative on a two-man Army-Navy strategy board. The Navy's representative to the joint board, Capt. Albert S. Barker, was also already a member of the Naval War Board. These two men were entrusted with creating a joint operational plan for the war with Spain. While the plan that the board developed was not as detailed as modern war plans, it did facilitate each service's understanding of the other's mission and how the services would support one another. The achievements of Wagner's MID helped prove the value of a general staff–type organization in the United States Army. His leadership and

Albert S. Barker, shown here as a rear admiral and commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, in 1900

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Nelson A. Miles, shown here as a lieutenant general, c. 1902

knowledge helped to ensure that a true general staff on the European model would be established following the Spanish-American War. Its creation was a triumph for progressive officers such as Wagner.[29]

Wagner's contributions to military education directly affected the professional development of those officers assigned to the Army's schools, while the general staff he paved the way for greatly improved the Army's ability to plan for war. However, no system existed to assist commanders and their staffs in improving the performance of their formations as a whole.Wagner significantly aided commanders by developing a system of lesson-learning that consisted of critiques of the Army's recent combat actions, and after-action reviews of the Army's peacetime maneuvers. A major factor in the increased effectiveness of the United States Army since the turn of the twentieth century was the legacy of lesson-learning left by Wagner.[30]

At the request in 1899 of the Commanding General of the United States Army, Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, Wagner prepared a report on the Army's 1898 Santiago campaign during the Spanish-American War. The report began the practice within the Army of examining what the Army did right and what it did poorly and why, in order to improve its effectiveness in combat. Wagner's report offered an unvarnished critique of the Army's operations. He pointed out that the invasion force failed to conduct a proper reconnaissance and that coordination between the infantry and field artillery was lacking. The report touched on technical advances that impacted combat such as the effects of smokeless powder and addressed actions during the preparatory phase of operations, including the mismanagement and confusion in the ports of embarkation. In contrast to the prevailing trend in favor of overemphasizing the power of morale to drive home any offensive, Wagner retained a grounded view and observed the increasing power of the defender. This was an observation many officers would come to appreciate after the enormous casualties of the First World War.[31]

Despite the formal request for Wagner's report, it was not published as an official Army document, though it was widely read as copies of it were informally passed around among officers. It was only in 1907, two years after his death, that the report was published in large quantities. This straightforward look at recent combat operations was the first of its kind in the Army's history and set a bold precedent that allowed the Army to learn from its mistakes and become a much more effective fighting force.[32]

Though Wagner's report on the 1898 Santiago campaign lacked the backing of the Army, his four reports on the Army's postwar maneuvers did receive support. These reports were constructed along lines similar to that of the Santiago campaign report.

Because of the demands Indian fighting had historically placed on the Army, since 1869 it had assembled for training in regimental or higher strength on only two occasions: in 1887 the 12th Infantry conducted maneuvers while the 21st Infantry did the same in 1889. Wagner had long been an advocate of the large annual maneuvers that European powers such as France and Germany conducted to train their armies.[33]

Though approved by Secretary Root in 1899, the Army's first maneuvers would not be conducted until 1902 because of the Philippine Insurrection. These maneuvers, conducted at Fort Riley, Kansas, were the first attempt by the U.S. Army to incorporate formations of both the Regular Army and National Guard and to practice the exercise of higher command functions within the context of a field exercise. The maneuvers consisted of six thousand officers and men from the Regular Army and National Guard organized into a division of two brigades, divisional cavalry, and divisional artillery, all under the command of Maj. Gen. John C. Bates. In addition to Bates' force, the maneuvers attracted National Guard officers from twenty-two states and territories as observers.[34]

Wagner was selected to serve as the chief umpire for the exercise because of his extensive experience conducting tactical problems while he was head of the Department of Military Art at Fort Leavenworth. A large part of the responsibility for planning the Army's first major maneuvers was left to Wagner. He used a modified version

General Bates, c. 1902

U.S. Army

of the rules that were in place at Leavenworth. Wagner developed a multi-echelon training strategy consisting of nine tactical problems that ensured that all personnel and formations were trained. The problems covered tactical tasks such as the conduct of an advance guard and rear guard, deployment of a division for battle, movement to contact, the attack and defense of a convoy, outpost exercise, and the attack and defense of a position.[35]

Following each exercise, the officers were assembled and were read the reports of the opposing commanders and chief umpire. At the conclusion of the reports, the officers were given the opportunity to comment in order to correct any errors or explain their actions. Wagner was ideally suited to facilitate these sessions because of his acknowledged expertise. His experience on the faculty at the Infantry and Cavalry School made it natural for him to take these opportunities to analyze the units' performance and suggest ways for them to increase their effectiveness. This discussion of the recently completed tactical problem, or after-action review, was the beginning of the Army's doctrine of lesson-learning.[36]

Wagner's contributions to the modernization and professionalism of the United States Army helped keep it within the mainstream of other Western militaries and set the conditions for the Army's greatest successes in the first half of the twentieth century. He was the key individual in the most influential accomplishment of the military reformers; the establishment of a respected system of military schools that would reform the Army through education. Wagner's leadership of the Military Information Division and role in planning the war with Spain helped to ensure that a true general staff on the European model would be established following the Spanish-American War. Finally, Wagner's reports on the Army's annual maneuvers and on the Santiago campaign of 1898 set the precedent for the doctrine of lesson-learning. This valuable tool allowed the Army to learn from its mistakes and become a much more effective fighting force.[37]

While largely unknown today, Arthur L. Wagner left a lasting mark on the United States Army. Though better-known military reformers such as Emory Upton may have advocated the establishment of military schools and a general staff, both on the German model, it was Wagner who had the much more difficult job of translating these ideas into a functioning and credible reality. Unfortunately, the era in history he occupied, between the American Civil War and the Great War, is generally regarded as the "dark ages" of the United States Army, and as a result, his achievements have failed to garner the attention they deserve.[38]

Colonel Wagner, c. 1902



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Notes

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30. Brereton, "First Lessons in Modern War," p. 89; Nenninger, *The Leavenworth School and the Old Army*, p. 39.

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37. Nenninger, *The Leavenworth School and the Old Army*, pp. 4, 48.

38. Millet and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, p. 271; Nenninger, *The Leavenworth School and the Old Army*, p. 15; Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, p. 280.

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

BOOK REVIEWS

Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces



By Steven R. Ward
Georgetown University Press, 2009
Pp. xiv, 380. $29.95

Review by Gary Hobin

One of the often-quoted excerpts from Sun Tzu asserts that a successful battlefield commander must know his adversary as well as—if not better than—he knows his own forces. In the current strategic environment, one of our adversaries, for good or ill, is Iran. Steven Ward's book, *Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces,* provides a valuable starting point for developing an understanding of that particular adversary. The book is strong on narrative, well written, and engaging. It provides a coherent historical framework for those seeking to begin developing an understanding of twenty-first century Iran. Narrative strength aside, however, the book is weak on analysis. The author identifies historical points of origin for current characteristics of Iran's military, but aside from stating that these characteristics continue over time, leaves the reader questioning why these particular characteristics continued while others did not. Read this book to begin developing understanding, but do not look here for in-depth analysis of Iran's military history.

Ward's portrait of Iran's military history is painstakingly developed. The canvas on which he first sketches, then colors in the portrait, is vast, in keeping with the lengthy historical record of civilizations on the Iranian highlands. His brief introduction details the Iranian armed forces immediately before the Islamic Revolution when, in his view, the forces were at the height of their power. He then pulls back to begin Chapter 1 with an account of the Achaemenids, who, he reminds us, created the first Persian Empire in the sixth century BCE. Its monarch Cyrus the Great, ruling from 550 to 530 BCE, established the tradition of a "strong core of well-trained and professional forces loyal to the state" (p. 11). This tradition, Ward offers, would serve succeeding Iranian rulers well. These Persian professionals, Ward continues, fought the Greeks at Marathon, Thermopylae, and Salamis. While Western history trumpets the Greeks' defense, Ward reminds us that the Persians had achieved remarkable success in organizing, transporting, and supplying a massive army and that Persian soldiers had demonstrated exceptional bravery and combat discipline against the Greeks.

Ward continues his account of premodern Persia with the Parthians and their wars with the Romans. The Parthian heavy cavalryman, he notes, "was one of the most able and feared fighters of antiquity [and] carried a large and powerful compound bow that outranged Roman and others' weapons and was capable of propelling arrows strongly enough to penetrate the armor of Roman legionaries" (p. 27). Parthian heavy cavalry, however, could not match Roman legions in engineering and siege capabilities, an edge that led to Parthian defeats. Parthians, weakened by Trajan's legions, succumbed to a provincial dynasty, known as the Sassanians, that became the next rulers of Persia. Ward argues that these Sassanians, like the Achaemenids and Parthians, adopted practices that subsequent Persian rulers would employ to strengthen their rule. In this case, the Sassanian monarchy "tied itself closely to religion [and] resuscitated Zoroastrianism as the state religion" (p. 30).

Ward continues his chronology with warfare between the Sassanians and empires of Rome and Byzantium, the subsequent Arab conquests, and the Mongol invasions. Throughout, Ward highlights aspects of Persian statecraft that he argues remain visible in the twenty-first century. One more example of this from Ward's narrative: "The Safavid dynasty (1501–1760), which made Persia once again a center of high civilization and wealth, joined Persian culture to the creed of Shia Islam, which has ever since defined and inspired Iran as a nation" (p. 41).

Having portrayed the rise and decline of Persian dynasties from the sixth century BCE to the beginning of the sixteenth century CE in the first chapter of his narrative, Ward devotes the next several chapters to the Safavid and Qajar dynasties of early modern Persia. Here, he introduces themes of foreign intervention that continue to agitate Persian and Iranian politics in the twenty-first century. The Qajars, he notes, "came to power just as Iran was becoming the focus of Russian ambitions, British concerns over the defense of India, and the schemes of Napoleon's France" (p. 62). Czarist Russia enters the narrative, first as a sometime ally against the Ottomans, then as an invader seeking to control southern approaches to its empire. The British likewise first enter as allies in con-

trolling the waters of the Persian Gulf, later as foreign occupiers using Iran as a pawn in protecting India. In both cases, Qajar armies proved ineffective, but as Ward reports, "the Russians . . . were surprised by how well the Iranians fought. British and French observers, often the most severe critics of the Iranians they were advising, also were struck by the Iranians' courage and capacity to endure hardship" (p. 75). This courage and hardiness are additional characteristics that Ward argues are a continuing feature of Iran's military history.

Ward's two-chapter narrative of Qajar rulers carries his history into the early twentieth century. Qajar Iran's initial proclamation of neutrality in World War I was essentially disregarded by the warring powers; in what may be one of the least recognized theaters of that war, Iran became a useful arena for German intrigue to threaten British India and Czarist Russia. British and Imperial Russian efforts to use Persia as a staging area for attacks on the Ottomans, together with British measures to combat German agents' work in organizing tribal warriors as indigenous proxies to threaten British commercial and imperial interests, resulted in intense Iranian resentment, which remained long after the war ended.

Ward documents in a separate chapter the Qajar dynasty's collapse and replacement by an officer of the Iranian Cossack Brigade. He narrates the origin and development of two separate military organizations within Iran: the Gendarmerie, charged with internal security, and the Iranian Cossack Brigade, focused mainly on protecting the regime from foreigners and insurrectionists. The Gendarmerie, he argues, was more nationalistic and democratic, while the Cossack Brigade (later a division) was more pro-monarchy and authoritarian. Reza Khan, an officer of the Cossack Brigade, eventually replaced the last Qajar ruler and crowned himself Shah in December 1925 as Reza Shah Pahlavi.

Ward's next chapters carry the narrative through World War II and the Cold War. Having demonstrated the origins of relevant features in Iran's history, he shows how they influenced the history of Iran and the Middle East in the past ninety years. Reza Shah and his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, relied on a strong core of professional military leaders, loyal to the state as did their predecessors; they also focused their attention on benefiting a cadre of privileged leaders, while neglecting care of their soldiers. In this, Ward argues, they repeated the Qajar precedent of wasting the Iranians' "demonstrated qualities of bravery, resourcefulness and a dogged ability to endure hardship" (p. 61). Not surprisingly, Ward argues that the theme of wasted qualities would be repeated in the Iran-Iraq War.

In Chapter 8, Ward analyzes Iran's Islamic Revolution in some detail, identifying key events leading to the revolution and those taking place during the few months of conflict. Ward blames the Shah's personal indecisiveness and his autocratic rule in which all governmental decisions were to be made by him alone for the eventual collapse of the regime. Mohammad Reza Shah, Ward argues, failed to recognize that the revolutionary leaders of 1978 were not political rivals who could be bought off, as he and his predecessors had done for generations; rather, they were motivated by an ideology that appealed to many ordinary Iranians. The Shah's military chiefs had no experience in coordinating actions among the services and were therefore incapable of reacting to a dynamic situation in the streets. Ward points out, in addition, that the common Western perception that masses of Iranians supported Ayatollah Khomeini and his revolutionaries in opposition to an increasingly isolated Shah is only partially correct. The true picture, Ward argues, is much more complex. His narrative bears this out.

Ward's chapter on the Iran-Iraq War is probably the best in the book. In addition to a narrative of battles, he describes the internal debates within the Iranian forces between the professional military and the leaders of the Revolutionary Guards as well as between combat commanders and the clerical hard-liners who directed these commander's battlefield efforts. He is highly critical, and rightly so in this reviewer's opinion, of the clerical regime's leaders who placed more reliance on ideology than on hard-nosed military advice. As a result, "[t]he war was an unmitigated disaster for Iran and its armed forces" (p. 297). Ward provides an estimated cost of the war to Iran: a direct cost of the war ($160 billion) and the costs of reconstruction ($450 billion). These dollar costs are significant enough, but the human costs, which he states came from Iranian sources, are in the range of 200,000 to 220,000 killed, with an additional 350,000 to 400,000 wounded.

In the last chapter, the author summarizes Iran's place in history and offers conclusions. Following one of the strongest chapters in the book, this last chapter is the weakest. While Ward points out that the Iranian soldier has served his country well, fighting bravely and resourcefully against enemies of the state, he concludes that "Iran's shame is that its rulers repeatedly have taken its soldiers for granted or taken a cavalier attitude toward their sacrifices," and that "[b]y ignoring the professional military's advice, the hard-line clerics and Pasdaran took advantage of the volunteer militia members' patriotism and devotion, condemning tens of thousands to needless death" (p. 311). His great conclusion is that the West should not despise Iran as an adversary, nor take them for granted as being unable to hold their own against a technologically superior force. This is hardly profound analysis.

The strength of Ward's book is its summary of Iran's ancient and modern history. This is a great single-source document for a narrative of the empires centered on the Iranian highlands. It also helps one to understand the Iranian view of the world, which is a critical element of analyzing current events in the region.

However strong it is on narrative, the book is weak on analysis of the events. Although the author provides hints of the underlying reasons, he fails to probe deeply enough to address why the political and military traditions he identifies have survived. He also fails to recognize the significant theological differences between the various strains of Shia Islam. He makes no mention of the differences, for example, between the Sevener and Twelver sects of Shia Islam, differences that help to explain the distinctions between those Shia who live in Iran and their fellows who reside on the southern side of the Gulf. Some

of those differences are now playing out in the Gulf region.

Ward's readers would have been better served if his publisher had included additional maps to illustrate the text. There are a total of eleven maps, four of which are in the chapter on the Iran-Iraq War, leaving only seven to illustrate significant events of the previous twenty-five centuries. Readers would also have been well served with an appendix collecting the names and dates of the dynasties and rulers therein. A nonspecialist can become bewildered by the sequence of Qajar rulers, for example, and a simple list would have improved understanding.

Overall, Ward's *Immortal* succeeds in providing a starting point for understanding Iran's military, and for understanding the world view of Iranians in the twenty-first century. It provides a convenient summary of the roughly three thousand years of continuous national existence that Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi celebrated in the decade before his downfall. The book is more than a military history of Iran; it provides a window into the interests of a significant player in the region. Unfortunately, the book fails to go beyond its narrative. It gives readers a starting point, but those who look for more nuanced understanding must seek elsewhere.

Gary Hobin is a retired U.S. Army infantry officer and foreign area officer. A graduate of Dartmouth College and the University of Chicago, he has held command and staff positions in the United States, as well as in Germany and other overseas locations. He served on a mobile training team in Iran in the early 1970s and, while assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan, became the first U.S. Army officer in the Personnel Exchange Program with the Jordanian Army. After retiring from the Army, he joined the U.S. State Department as a foreign service officer, serving in Syria and Saudi Arabia. He is currently an assistant professor in the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Counterinsurgency

By David Kilcullen
Oxford University Press, 2010
Pp. x, 251. $15.95

Review by John R. Ballard

Every potential reader should be aware that this book is unlike David Kilcullen's other efforts, most principally *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York, 2009), in the sense that it is more a collage of his previous analyses than a single coherent narrative. As he says in his preface, it is also a "snapshot of wartime thinking" not a finished theory—so the book includes a number of complex and sometimes controversial ideas (p. x). That said, it remains a very useful work for three reasons. First, the book makes counterinsurgency easily understandable and provides several broadly different examples of how it can be conducted. Second, it summarizes many of the most useful insights from Kilcullen's broad experience into chapters that can be used as a how-to for this most complex type of warfare. Finally, the book does provide a vehicle to consider how counterinsurgencies differ in such diverse locales as Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor, and even on a global scale—where Kilcullen has plied his trade.

Counterinsurgency begins with one of the best short analytical sections of the work in the book's introduction. Here the author offers a well-focused review of the essence of insurgency and the two dominating factors that stand out in his rich experience as keys to success: the need to focus on local solutions and respect for noncombatants. Kilcullen's explanation of those two factors illustrates the recurring philosophy of the book, which convinces the reader that counterinsurgency is a complex and challenging form of combat that requires the application of very different rules in every place where it is to be conducted, yet must always somehow accommodate an approach that in the end, protects and promotes the people that the local government is designed to serve.

Each chapter of the book centers on some previously written article, plus an update Kilcullen has drawn from his more recent experience. The first chapter includes the work that made Kilcullen famous, his rewrite of the famous "Twenty-Seven Articles" of T. E. Lawrence. His resulting "Twenty-Eight Articles" lays out the fundamentals of tactical counterinsurgency most useful to combat commanders on the ground. This chapter is worth the price of the book. Any combatant will improve his odds of successfully ending an insurgency if these twenty-eight ideas are put into practice effectively. In this latest version of the article, the author adds a useful prologue to his original 2006 piece, informing readers that his ideas resulted from the bottom-up review and broad deliberations that marked the effort to develop the new *Counterinsurgency* field manual of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps the previous year.

The second chapter is as useful as the first, but for different reasons. In Chapter 2, Kilcullen takes on one of the most difficult problems facing any nation in modern counterinsurgency: how to tell if one's strategy is succeeding. In particular, Kilcullen confronts the "how to measure success" challenge directly using the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan as his test example. His contrast of "common metrics" and "more useful metrics" is striking, relevant, and illuminates the current debate concerning the American effort in support of President Hamid Karzai. His list of "enemy indicators" should cause many commanders on the ground in Afghanistan to pause.

Many readers might skip over the third chapter because few people seem interested in Indonesian approaches to counterinsurgency or the conflict in tiny East Timor. However, this section of the book provides one of the most useful, short-case studies of modern counterinsurgency one can find in print. Kilcullen describes the tactics used by the Indonesian Army and how they worked in one area and failed in another. Even more useful, he manages to make the real impact of globalization very evident in the application of Indonesia's counterinsurgency strategy in East Timor—where the insurgents had learned very well how to use the international stage to their great advantage.

The next section of the book is less an analysis than another case study, this time focused on Kilcullen's personal experiences on the Mootain Bridge engagement following the United Nations intervention in East Timor in 1999. This chapter demonstrates the power of the media and the need for the combatants to think strategically in every area of their counterinsurgency operations, an aspect that is important to every counterinsurgency effort.

Chapter 5 (based on a speech Kilcullen gave in 2009) is yet another departure from the analytical norm. There the author outlines some of his most philosophical musing, attempting rather successfully to link timeless historical perspectives of counterinsurgency to the big picture strategies of today's campaigns. In particular, his theory of "competitive control" is compelling, if still very difficult to apply in most operational contexts.

In Part II of the book, Kilcullen takes on an even greater intellectual challenge—outlining a general theory for combating what he sees as the global Islamist insurgency effort of al-Qaeda. Since every case he has used previously falls within a single nation-state context (and thus is framed by a single political and legal system), Kilcullen feels he must offer a different paradigm for the development of a global counterinsurgency that must cross multiple borders, jurisdictions, and outlooks. In Kilcullen's view, such a counterinsurgency campaign is inherently more complex than any state model can accommodate. Therefore, he outlines ways of managing the multiple variables required of the new global effort. Every committed critic of the "war on terrorism" viewpoint needs to read this counter theory, if for no other reason than to hone their own understanding of the issues. Here Kilcullen is at his best explaining the global movement, the linkages between the movement's theaters of operation, and the "systems model of insurgency"; his short sections on adaptation in insurgent groups and "critical mass" are also superb. His "strategy of disaggregation" should be understood by any strategic planner working to further U.S. national security objectives against terrorism in the near term.

This book gives the reader much more than a better understanding of the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. It encapsulates numerous particularly relevant insights into the tactical, operational, and strategic challenges of counterinsurgency; plus it offers the most succinct overview of how to wage a global counterinsurgency anywhere. Kilcullen intended the book for counterinsurgency experts, as well as a general audience; his analysis is both pertinent and thought provoking and is presented in a readable and easily understood format. This would be a superb base text for any counterinsurgency course.

Dr. John R. Ballard is dean of faculty and academic programs and professor of strategic studies at the National War College in Washington, D.C. He is a retired marine and combat veteran of the Iraq War. He is the author of six books, including *From Storm to Freedom: The Long American War with Iraq* (Annapolis, Md., 2010). His professional journal articles have appeared in *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, *Joint Force Quarterly*, *Military Review*, the U.S. Naval Institute's *Proceedings*, and the *Marine Corps Gazette*.

The Last Camel Charge: The Untold Story of America's Desert Military Experiment



By Forrest Bryant Johnson
Berkley Caliber, 2012
Pp. vii, 365. $25.95

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

As modern-day travelers drive across southern Arizona on Interstate Highway 10, from Phoenix to Los Angeles, California, they can visit a strange monument near the small town of Quartzsite. The ten-foot-tall, pyramid-shaped stone monument marks the tomb of "Hi Jolly," an Arab named Hadji Ali, who came to the United States to help manage a herd of camels that were brought to the American Southwest as an Army experiment in the 1850s. The story of these animals is told in *The Last Camel Charge: The Untold Story of America's Desert Military Experiment*, by Forrest Bryant Johnson, a longtime resident of the Southwest who writes and conducts off-road desert tours from his home in Las Vegas, Nevada.

The Army's camel experiment was authorized by Jefferson Davis, in his capacity as the U.S. secretary of war, in 1855. Maj. Henry C. Wayne, an 1838 graduate of West Point, had mentioned the idea of testing camels in 1848 to then-Senator Davis of Mississippi. After Davis became secretary of war, he became interested in determining whether camels were superior to horses and mules in transporting supplies between the military posts that were located in the arid American Southwest. He was able to convince Congress to appropriate $30,000 for "the purchase and importation of camels and dromedaries to be employed for military

purposes" (p. 73). In 1856, Major Wayne was dispatched to the Middle East to buy the camels, which were then transported back to the port of Indianola, Texas, along with eight camel drivers, two of whom were nicknamed Hi Jolly and Greek George. Some seventy healthy camels were delivered to Texas in two shipments.

After the camels reached Camp Verde, about fifty miles northwest of San Antonio, Navy Lt. Edward F. Beale, a Mexican War veteran and former superintendent of Indian affairs, incorporated them into an expedition to survey a military wagon road along the 35th Parallel to California. In June 1857, Lieutenant Beale selected twenty-five camels for his expedition, left the remaining animals at Camp Verde, and headed westward across Texas to El Paso, and then northwest across modern-day New Mexico to Fort Defiance, the first Army post in what is now Arizona. From there, he conducted his road survey to Fort Tejon, in southern California. Beale was quite impressed with the capabilities of his camels, and he wrote that they were so quiet and gave so little trouble "that sometimes we forget they are with us. Certainly there never was anything so patient and enduring and so little troublesome, as this noble animal" (p. 149).

More military experiments involving camels followed. In 1859, Army 2d Lt. William H. Echols, was given the mission of taking some of the remaining Camp Verde camels on a reconnaissance into the rugged Big Bend region of west Texas and testing their ability to carry heavy loads of supplies to forts located there. Twenty-four camels began the expedition from Camp Hudson (about fifty miles north of Del Rio) and proceeded on to Fort Davis and then to Camp Stockton. The camels performed much better than the accompanying horses and mules, which were constantly in need of water. A year later, Lieutenant Echols led a twenty-camel caravan, with pack mules and infantry escort, from San Antonio to Camp Hudson and on to Fort Davis, before heading south to Presidio del Norte, a border town on the Rio Grande. He located a promising site for a fort on the river before returning to Camp Stockton.

In early 1861, the outbreak of the Civil War—in which Henry Wayne and William Echols chose to serve the South—and the Army's abandonment of its posts in western Texas put an end to these camel experiments, and they did not resume after the war ended. When Confederate forces occupied Camp Verde, they took possession of eighty camels, and "[s]ome of the animals, which were not corralled, wandered off to freedom on the Texas range" (p. 318). When federal troops reoccupied Camp Verde in 1866, they regained more than sixty camels, which were soon sold to the highest bidder.

Meanwhile, in 1863 on the West Coast, the Army authorized the Department of the Pacific to sell its small California camel herd, and an auction was held at Benicia Arsenal, near San Francisco, in 1864. Samuel Leneghan bought thirty-seven camels for $1,945, and he hired Hi Jolly to care for his herd. In 1934, the last of the Army's original camels, "Old Topsy," reportedly died, and its ashes are buried in the monument to Hi Jolly, who stayed in the United States, married, and finally died in Quartzsite in 1902. The author notes, however, that a small herd of wild camels, probably related to the original Army imports, have been seen in western Texas as recently as 2003.

The Last Camel Charge is an interesting book, although the author strays into several other topics that are somewhat marginally related to the Army's camel experiments. The author also chose not to provide an index for the volume, which greatly limits its utility as a reference. Nevertheless, readers who are looking for an account of offbeat military activities in the antebellum American Southwest will find much to enjoy in this book.

Roger D. Cunningham graduated from West Point in 1972 and retired from the U.S. Army in 1994. He is the author of *The Black Citizen-Soldiers of Kansas, 1864–1901* (Columbia, Mo., 2008), as well as numerous articles and book reviews, many of which have appeared in this journal.

Robert E. Lee and the Fall of the Confederacy, 1863–1865

By Ethan S. Rafuse
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008
Pp. xiv, 282. $37.95

Review by Robert A. Taylor

Robert E. Lee. The name conjures up images of battlefield prowess and one of history's great generals. Historians have wrestled with the famed Virginian and his place in Civil War military history almost since the guns fell silent in 1865. Was he a phenomenal commander only beaten by unending hordes of Union troops, or was he a narrow-minded, flawed general with an inflated reputation? Veteran Civil War scholar Ethan S. Rafuse wades into the controversy with a book that asks the fundamental question of how Lee could go from his greatest victory at Chancellorsville to final defeat and surrender in two years.

Rafuse comes out fully on Lee's side as a great general and strategist who, while not perfect, was the Confederacy's premier field commander. He knew, in the author's view, that the Confederate States could never gain independence by remaining on the defensive. Time and resources were not on the South's side. Smashing victories against federal forces offered the only answer. Hopefully such losses would sap the Northern will to continue a war to preserve the Union and lead to permanent separation of the rebel states. Lee was well aware by mid-1863 that his Army of Northern Virginia weakened day by day even without battle losses. Disease and increasing desertions took troops away from the firing line and no steady source of replacements was at hand.

The clash at Chancellorsville was indeed a tremendous tactical victory against Joseph Hooker's Army of the Potomac, but Lee saw it as barren of strategic gain and costly in terms of casualties. Surprisingly, Rafuse is one of the few modern historians with positive things to say about "Fighting Joe" Hooker at Chancellorsville and beyond. Hooker did preserve his army after the debacle in the Wilderness and set in motion what would soon become the Gettysburg campaign. His replacement, George G. Meade, joined other Union commanders, in Rafuse's estimation, who were increasingly less likely to make the sort of battlefield mistakes that Lee had been capitalizing on since early 1862. Indeed, a major theme of *Robert E. Lee and the Fall of the Confederacy, 1863–1865,* is how the Union Army improved and in the end wrecked the Confederacy's military power.

The need to strike in order to survive led General Lee to advocate and then execute the controversial invasion of Pennsylvania. With rebel fortunes ebbing in places like Vicksburg, and stalemate not an option, moving northward made strategic sense. The resulting three-day carnage at Gettysburg was Lee attempting to crush the Federals and depress Northern home-front morale. Unfortunately, solid leadership from Meade to corps commanders like Winfield S. Hancock, to lowly colonels like Joshua L. Chamberlin, coupled with effective use of local terrain, made the sort of victory Lee sought impossible to accomplish there. He was certain "only a loss in Northern will to continue the war could save the Confederacy in 1863, and the only way to bring that about was to achieve decisive success on the battlefield" (p. 93).

Neither Meade nor soon Ulysses S. Grant would offer Lee the chance at a Cannae-style triumph. The ailing commander found himself facing a determined, capable opponent in Grant, who enjoyed the confidence of the Lincoln administration. Circumstances pitted the two in the 1864 Overland campaign in a series of battles that pushed both of their armies to the brink of endurance. Grant's blue-clad soldiers paid a high price for his ever-southward push, but the North and President Abraham Lincoln continued to support such operations. Even Lee rejected the notion that Grant was a dull "butcher" and praised his skill. Despite intense fighting that seemed closer to Verdun than to Bull Run, Lee handled his men as well as anyone could, considering the circumstances.

Grant would not be denied reaching his ultimate goal of crossing the James River and threatening Petersburg. On learning of this movement, Lee confessed to another officer that when the Army of the Potomac moved over the James "it will become a siege, and then it will only be a matter of time" (p. 163). Siege warfare meant the end to major maneuvering that might let Lee cripple the unwary Yankees. However, Lee would soldier on, and his army remained an active, dangerous enemy for the next nine months in the trenches of Petersburg.

Rafuse rightly refers to operations around Petersburg as a "quasi-siege" as both protagonists probed and looked for opportunities to exploit. Lee never surrendered his strategy of offensive blows when possible, which included trying to find old glory in the Shenandoah Valley by sending Jubal Early north in hopes of causing panic in Washington, D.C. Even with the rebel forces at the gates of the capital, Lincoln held firm and let Grant stay on the Petersburg front. The North's superior manpower enabled him to send forces under Sheridan to wreck the Shenandoah and crush Early. This victory, combined with Union wins from Atlanta to Mobile Bay, gave Lincoln another term as president and sealed the Confederacy's fate.

The coming of spring in 1865 saw Grant's final assault on Petersburg and Lee's evacuation of Richmond. Rafuse chronicles the oft-told tale of Lee's last agonizing campaign that ended in defeat and surrender at Appomattox Court House. Lee proved himself a responsible commander by refusing to sanction the scattering of his men into guerrilla bands to continue resistance. The author concludes that turning to unconventional operations would have been an admission that the Confederate government had clearly failed to adequately defend its people from the federal invaders.

In the end, why did Lee end up in Wilmer McLean's front parlor in April 1865? Faltering Confederate military and government structure, and of course the powerful Union Army, spelled doom for the Army of Northern Virginia. Perhaps the question should rather be: How was Lee able to maintain his army in the face of such obstacles for almost two years and stay an effective foe right up to capitulation? It is hard to imagine any other military Confederate leader making that happen.

This study of Lee's war is a great companion volume to Rafuse's works on George B. McClellan and Meade, and builds on the scholarship of historians like Steven E. Woodworth. It asks interesting questions and, at times, offers surprising answers and interpretations about the Civil War in the Virginia theater. Military and Civil War scholars will benefit from its insightfulness, while "buffs" will enjoy another look at how the leaders in blue and gray fought the American Iliad.

Dr. Robert A. Taylor is professor of history and head of the Humanities and Communication Department at the Florida Institute of Technology. He is the author or editor of seven books and is currently working on a military history of Florida from 1492 to the present.

Black Officer in a Buffalo Soldier Regiment: The Military Career of Charles Young



By Brian G. Shellum
University of Nebraska Press, 2010
Pp. xxi, 360. $19.95

Review by Roberto Fernandez

Many Americans today have a limited understanding of African American

leaders and their contributions to American history. If asked to name a significant African American leader, most responses would be limited to individuals like Rosa Parks, Harriet Tubman, Martin Luther King Jr., or Malcolm X. However, few, if any, would name Col. Charles Young. *Black Officer in a Buffalo Soldier Regiment: The Military Career of Charles Young,* by Brian G. Shellum, chronicles the career of Young from his West Point graduation in 1889 until his death in Nigeria in 1922. This book continues the story that Shellum started in *Black Cadet in a White Bastion: Charles Young at West Point* (Lincoln, Neb., 2006). His motive for writing about Young was to restore Charles Young to "the prominent place in history he deserves" (p. xi). During his career, Young served as a cavalry officer, Reserve Officers' Training Corps instructor, defense attaché, and national park superintendent. In all of these duties, he proved himself capable of leading soldiers and exceeded the expectations of his superiors while setting new standards for African Americans in the United States Army.

The narrative opens with Charles Young awaiting his assignment orders following his graduation from West Point. He was the third black officer to graduate from West Point and the only black officer to graduate and receive his commission in 1889. Shellum informs readers that the "Army's policy at that time was to assign any black graduates of West Point to one of the four African-American regiments" (p. 2). This policy was to avoid having black officers leading white soldiers. Young was eventually assigned to the 9th Cavalry, becoming the second black officer in the regiment. He reported to Fort Robinson, Nebraska, in November 1889 and quickly began learning the duties and responsibilities of a second lieutant of cavalry. Being a black officer on a primarily white post isolated him from the other officers in a climate that was not conducive, welcoming, or concerned with his growth or development as an officer. During his first four months, he performed ordinary garrison duties. Because he was not allowed to lead cadets while attending West Point, he was written up for various errors of military protocol. Young learned from his initial mistakes and was given command of Troop B when the troop commander was on detached duty. The rotation of Young's troop in 1890 to Fort Duchesne, Utah, would eventually allow Young to grow and excel.

When he arrived at his new post, Young learned that not all Army officers treated him with contempt and apathy. Under the command of Capt. Louis Rucker, a positive and an effective leader, Young was able to mature as an officer. During his four years at Fort Duchesne, Young showed such improvement that he was given several additional duties, including quartermaster and post adjutant. These experiences fortified his experience as an officer and would help him throughout his career.

In the winter of 1894, Young received orders to report to Wilberforce University in Ohio to serve as professor of military science and tactics. In this capacity, he created a military science program for the students of this African American university. He used his West Point experience as the template for the program and established a cadet battalion with high-achieving students holding leadership positions. Young's program lacked the resources of other universities, yet he improvised and overcame those obstacles. He added to his burden by voluntarily teaching, without compensation, "classes in French, Chemistry, Descriptive Geometry and Geology" (p. 55). Young made significant contributions to his race through his promotion of education.

The book does not introduce Young from his birth in Kentucky as a slave, nor does it go into detail about his time at West Point. This information, contained in the author's earlier work, *Black Cadet in a White Bastion: Charles Young at West Point,* provides an understanding of the early life of Charles Young. After reading the first book, this reviewer was better able to comprehend the narrative that continues in *Black Officer in a Buffalo Soldier Regiment.* The book, with its well written narrative, immediately captures and maintains the imagination of the reader. The chapters are organized chronologically, beginning with Charles Young awaiting orders in his hometown after graduating from West Point and concludes with his burial in Arlington National Cemetery in 1923.

Through his research and writing, Shellum has started a conversation on a significant figure in African American history that has thus far been overlooked. Shellum notes in the preface that there "is a lack of primary resources about the man" (p. xi). However, this is not reflected in the book, which seems well documented and shows extensive research. The author cites primary sources for this book from the National Archives and Records Administration, state historical societies, various newspapers and magazines from the period, and numerous private collections.

Shellum has written a volume that both informs and entertains. *Black Officer in a Buffalo Soldier Regiment* deserves the attention of anyone interested in the history of the cavalry in the American West or the contributions of African Americans in the United States Army.

Roberto Fernandez served in the 478th Civil Affairs Battalion for eight years as a civil affairs sergeant. He is currently an American history teacher in Broward County, Florida.

Hitler's Panzers: The Lightning Attacks That Revolutionized Warfare



By Dennis Showalter
Berkley Publishing Group, 2009
Pp. vi, 390. $25.95

Review by Jason C. Engle

In *Hitler's Panzers: The Lightning Attacks That Revolutionized Warfare*,

Dennis Showalter provides a masterful, balanced assessment of the development of German tank doctrine and its employment and effectiveness in the campaigns of World War II. The book flows chronologically, beginning with the early post–World War I proponents of mobilized and armored warfare and its place within the Reichswehr's tactical doctrine. Adolf Hitler's accession of power and Germany's involvement in the Spanish Civil War served as formative experiences in the evolution and refinement of German armored doctrine and tank design. The newly christened Wehrmacht exercised the doctrine of lightning war with staggering success on all of Germany's fronts. The last chapters of the book center on the disintegration of the Nazi war machine—especially its panzer divisions—and its slow backpedal into the heart of Germany. Showalter argues that the panzer and mobile infantry divisions were the backbone of the German Wehrmacht and its doctrine of "blitzkrieg," reshaping conceptualizations of conventional warfare in the twentieth century. Moreover, Hitler's panzers functioned as the engines of Nazi "exterminatory warfare."

Despite the German Army's preoccupation with infantry and passive interest in the tank during World War I, influential German officers and theorists such as Hans von Seeckt, Ernst Volckheim, and Heinz Guderian believed that mechanization represented the future of warfare. Moreover, mobile warfare was well suited to the established Prussian canon emphasizing short, "front-loaded," decisive wars, as captured by Robert Citino in *The German Way of War* (Lawrence, Kans., 2005) (p. 4). The stiff military limitations of the Versailles Treaty reinforced the German orientation toward maneuver, speed, and flexibility, "situational awareness" (*Fingerspitzenefühl* and *Tuchfühling*), a flexible command structure, and an emphasis on aggressiveness and daring (p. 10). Early German armored doctrine owed much to the principles and observation of British, French, and Soviet field exercises and tank design. This was due largely to the fact that the Versailles Treaty prohibited the Reichswehr from possessing armored vehicles. Despite the fact that much of the German tank doctrine reflected concepts and practices of its peers, its emphasis on mobility, envelopment, and maintaining the initiative was all its own (p. 40).

Hitler was the catalyst for the transformation of German armored doctrine from just a theoretical discourse to a practicable reality. His open disregard for the Versailles sanctions delighted the army's newly reestablished General Staff. Real tanks, war games, and evaluations replaced crude models, mock simulations, and rough estimations by Reichswehr theoreticians. German military involvement in the Spanish Civil War revealed the virtues of close air-ground cooperation. As Showalter contends, the Luftwaffe emerged as a vital element to the success of German lightning attacks. It provided tactical reconnaissance, close air support in the form of Stuka dive-bombers, and an effective means of resupplying panzer divisions (p. 75). Thus, the concentration of mass, speed, maneuver, flexibility, aggressiveness, and close air-ground cooperation were the core tenets of German tactical doctrine at the onset of World War II.

The success of Hitler's panzer divisions rested as heavily on its tactical doctrine as it did the chaos these lightning attacks generated. Tactical miscalculations and poor communication, particularly in the case of French and early Soviet opposition, were also important factors that aided the German victories. Nonetheless, German armored doctrine was undeniably effective, especially when executed by commanders such as Erwin Rommel who, according to Showalter, provided "arguably the most outstanding division-level command performance in modern military history" during the invasion of France (p. 98). The mass, shock, and speed of German lightning attacks overcame the superiority of French armor and, at least initially, the sheer weight of Russian numbers.

Despite the striking initial successes of Operation Barbarossa, German manpower and materiel deficiencies, and inadequate logistical planning, were the fundamental sources of the Wehrmacht's undoing. The inability of the German Army to maintain its armored and infantry strength gradually diminished its offensive potential just as the Red Army was increasing its fighting capability. The diversion of elements of Luftwaffe air support away from the Wehrmacht's largest theater of war—the Eastern Front—further weakened the Wehrmacht's offensive punch. The developed road networks and the accoutrements generally accompanying them, such as filling stations, stores, and towns, enjoyed in Poland, France, and even in the Baltics, were virtually nonexistent in the vast Russian steppe that separated the German Army from the major Soviet urban-industrial centers. Thus, resupply fell primarily on the shoulders of Germany as appropriation of food and materials from local sources on the steppe proved difficult at best. To make matters worse, the mud and rain of autumn and the bitter Russian winter halted Barbarossa, which allowed the Wehrmacht (and the Red Army) to retool, and set the stage for Operation Blue, and the armored showdown at Kursk. Showalter explains that statistically speaking the Wehrmacht lost far less in terms of tanks and soldiers than the Red Army and held the field at the end of the day. Nevertheless, Kursk represented the beginning of the end as it shattered the myth of Wehrmacht invincibility.

Showalter also does not duck the thorny issue of National Socialism and the impact its ideology had on German panzer divisions. While he sees the influence of National Socialism as minimal, at least initially, the movement nevertheless affected the outlook and operational objectives of panzer division soldiers and officers, especially with the emergence of the *SS Panzer Corps* in 1942. The corps' fanatical loyalty to the Führer and the apocalyptic racism of National Socialism engendered unwavering hardness and brutality, making the units of the *Waffen SS* "some of the most formidable combat formations in the brief history of armored war" (p. 242). Panzer divisions overlooked the atrocities committed by their SS counterparts, as their ferocity and toughness in battle was too valuable to confront over "reprisals."

Hitler's Panzers is a richly detailed study that any World War II enthusiast or scholar will find valuable. The book speaks to many facets of panzer historiography while telling an insightful operational and tactical narrative of the German panzer divisions during World War II. Moreover, Showalter's unique writing style makes for a highly enjoyable read. While the book's lack of citation or bibliography might be a source of frustration for some, the reader will certainly come away with a more sophisticated understanding of Hitler's panzers.

Jason C. Engle received his master's degree in military history from Norwich University in 2008 and is currently working as a graduate teaching assistant and Ph.D. candidate in modern European history at the University of Southern Mississippi. His dissertation will examine the identity, experience, and mentality of the reserve and volunteer soldiers who comprised the Austro-Hungarian *Landwehr* and *Landesschützen* infantry regiments in the First World War.

Learning Under Fire: The 112th Cavalry Regiment in World War II

By James S. Powell
Texas A&M University Press, 2010
Pp. xvi, 242. $40

Review by Alan M. Anderson

Sixty-five years after its conclusion, World War II continues to engender studies exploring nearly all aspects of the conflict. Books are published annually revealing the results of new research, rediscovering or re-analyzing prior work, or grappling with newly raised questions. The majority of new military history books relating to World War II tend to focus on the European Theater of Operations. A smaller number consider the Pacific theater. Within the Pacific theater, the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) has received little attention, at least concerning events up to the invasion of the Philippine Islands in October 1944. While the area commander, General Douglas MacArthur, has garnered much research along with (more recently) several of his subordinate commanders, the campaigns and operations in SWPA have been largely overlooked.[1]

James S. Powell's *Learning Under Fire: The 112th Cavalry Regiment in World War II* helps fill the gap that currently exists. It provides new insights on otherwise understudied operations in SWPA. The book discusses and examines the experiences of the Texas National Guard's 112th Cavalry from its federalization and instruction in the United States through its deployment overseas, its combat experiences in SWPA, to its involvement in the occupation of Japan and deactivation in January 1946. In many respects, the experiences of the 112th Cavalry were not necessarily unique when compared with other units that fought in the Southwest Pacific. However, *Learning Under Fire* also provides analysis that may be useful to today's military. As Powell explains, the experience of the 112th Cavalry Regiment in World War II is also

> a study of learning and tactical adaptation in military organizations. As such, it should strike a relevant chord for today's U.S. Army and Marine Corps leaders whose units in Afghanistan and Iraq face complex and often new challenges on a daily basis . . . [b]y examining the performance of one regiment as it met a wide range of challenges from campaign to campaign, this study turns an illuminating eye on the nuances of learning in military organizations (pp. xii–xiii).

Federalized in November 1940 supposedly for one year, the 112th Cavalry was a Texas National Guard unit that was completely horse-mounted at the start of the United States' formal involvement in World War II. The unit's precombat training was hampered by being chronically undermanned and underequipped. Arriving in New Caledonia as part of the island's Allied defense force, the regiment remained mounted as in prewar days. Horses for the unit were supplied from Australia, and it continued to conduct training and instruction as a horse cavalry unit until May 1943. "Among U.S. units that deployed to the Pacific theater, the 112th was essentially unique because of this period of mounted service" (p. 24).

The 112th had little more than a month to convert from a mounted outfit to the dismounted infantry element of an independent regimental combat team—the formation in which it fought for nearly all of the war. Fortunately, its initial amphibious operation, coming only forty-one days after giving up its horses, was unopposed. The former cavalry troopers now found themselves learning on the job, trying to develop both offensive and defensive jungle warfare capabilities under new conditions, which hampered training.

The regiment fought its first ground engagements beginning in mid-December 1943, when it landed on the Arawe Peninsula on New Britain. The unit had three weeks to prepare for the operation, and its troopers received only three days of training with the landing craft that would take them ashore. Thus began a cycle of combat operations that generally lasted weeks, followed by inadequate rest periods, insufficient training and replacements, and short-notice preparations for more combat operations—a cycle that was not unique to the 112th Cavalry in the Southwest Pacific.

In mid-July 1944, the unit received its sternest combat test to date when it was tasked with defending the Driniumor River on New Guinea. Assaulted by elements of three Japanese regiments, the 112th was forced to fall back three miles. Within two days, however, the regiment counterattacked and regained its original positions. It then spent almost four weeks defending against Japanese attacks and conducting offensive operations. By mid-August, when it was pulled out of the line, the 112th had lost approximately 20 to 25 percent of its strength due to all causes.

Two and a half months later—and with only one day to load its personnel and equipment on ships—the regiment found itself on Leyte in the Philippines. For the next six weeks, the troopers of the 112th conducted offensive combat operations against well-prepared Japanese defenses and strongpoints under miserable weather conditions and over harsh terrain. Never having faced such conditions, as Powell states, "the regiment found the well of its own experience dry" (p. 134). After only about four weeks of rest and refitting, the unit arrived on the island of Luzon. Attached to the 1st Cavalry Division, the cavalrymen spent their time defending against Japanese counterattacks, patrolling, and reconnoitering. Augmented with an attached infantry regiment, the unit spent the last few weeks of active operations working to break the main Japanese line of resistance. By the end of the Luzon campaign on 30 June 1945, the 112th had suffered nearly 50 percent turnover in its personnel.

The unit next expected to participate in the assault on the Japanese home islands. But with Japan's unconditional surrender on 15 August 1945, the troopers were once again forced to quickly prepare for a new task: occupation duty. The 112th Cavalry came ashore on the Japanese mainland on 3 September. It spent the next four months altering its focus, from intense combat operations to occupation, peacekeeping, and civil affairs duties. The regiment was finally relieved of its duties on 1 January 1946 and was deactivated two weeks later.

As Powell notes, "[e]xploring the 112th Cavalry's journey from Texas to Tokyo opens a window into the broader experience of American units that fought in SWPA" (p. 186). That journey shows the intense efforts necessary to learn under fire, to assimilate and disseminate within the organization the lessons of each combat operation, and to experience the consequences of any failure to adapt. New campaigns and operations often brought never-before-experienced challenges. Sometimes the regiment was able to meet those new tests, but more frequently, prior lessons were found wanting, usually due to insufficient time to prepare. As Powell indicates, it may also have been handicapped by the fact that it operated mostly as an independent regiment, and so did not have the ready ability to tap into the lessons learned of higher level commands.[2]

Powell recognizes that, as the American military faces the challenges of the twenty-first century, greater emphasis is being placed on the ability of units to accomplish multiple, often disparate, tasks. Adapting, learning, improving, and succeeding in the face of new situations now is required for commanders and those serving under them at every level. *Learning Under Fire* illustrates the difficulties inherent in such a requirement, and the often painful processes that must accompany it. As such, the book represents a valuable contribution to today's military, in addition to being a well-written history of the 112th Cavalry during World War II.

Notes

1. An exception is Stephen R. Taaffe, *MacArthur's Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign* (Lawrence, Kans., 1998).

2. See Peter R. Mansoor, *The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941–1945* (Lawrence, Kans., 1999). The author argues that in the European Theater of Operations, most innovation and adaptation in the American Army occurred at the divisional level.

Alan M. Anderson is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of War Studies at King's College, London. He received his J.D. degree from Cornell University and a master's degree in military history from Norwich University. He was awarded the 2009–2010 Edward S. Miller Research Fellowship in Naval History by the U.S. Naval War College. He has presented research papers at various regional and national history conferences, including the Society for Military History annual meeting. He is a contributor to four books from ABC-CLIO on various military history topics and has published book reviews in numerous journals, including *The Journal of Military History*.

Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945–1947



By D. M. Giangreco
Naval Institute Press, 2009
Pp. xxiii, 362. $36.95

Review by Mark Calhoun

In *Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945–1947*, author D. M. Giangreco constructs a brave and detailed defense of President Harry Truman's decision in 1945 to drop atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The author demonstrates that the resulting Japanese surrender forestalled an Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands that would have led to far greater casualties on both sides than those caused by the atom bombs.

This is no counterfactual, speculative work. Rather, *Hell to Pay* presents a detailed and well-supported argument based on the author's methodical analysis of vast evidence, in which he dissected from both sides' perspectives the available intelligence and detailed planning leading up to the invasion of the Japanese home islands. Not only has the author crafted a compelling narrative, but he has also decisively put to rest any question of the justification of President Truman's decision to use atom bombs to end the war with Japan.

The author faced several challenges in constructing his argument. These stem from a half century of impassioned criticisms of President Truman's decision, usually based on moral principle rather than objective historical analysis. Obstacles previously obscuring the facts range from suppression or distortion of historical evidence, to public exhibits and accounts in the popular media that portray a distorted version of the reality the Allies faced in 1945. For example, the author demonstrates that pre-invasion planning on both sides led to casualty estimates of between one-half and one million American military personnel, and at least as many Japanese soldiers and civilians—estimates often missing or downplayed in postwar historical analyses bent on condemning the use of atom bombs. *Hell to Pay* finally and decisively exposes the realities of the situation that led to President Truman's decision, proving beyond doubt that his decision led directly to the Japanese surrender, ultimately saved both American and Japanese lives, and rested on a solid foundation of detailed intelligence and sound military planning.

The author admits that he gives his topic what former colleagues at the Command and General Staff College would call the "Leavenworth treatment," in other words, a highly detailed military analysis with an emphasis on the finer points of the military planning process. However, this focus on the minute details of the actual plans that both the Allied and the Japanese war planners prepared demolishes the longstanding myths and misrepresentations that have for decades led to distorted perceptions of the events leading up to the end of the war with Japan. Counterintuitively, this methodical approach also results in much of the book's narrative strength. Rather than the dry, analytical study one might expect from a "Leavenworth treatment," *Hell to Pay* tells a story that is at once both disturbing and fascinating. The credit for the narrative's power lays both in its significant level of detail, lacking in previous analyses, and the author's skillful writing. The book serves as an example to other military historians that a talented researcher and writer can recount war planning in a manner just as engaging as the common bookstore fare of battle narratives and "great man" biographies.

The sheer immensity of the numbers involved in the planning for Operation *Downfall* staggers the mind. The author recounts the cost in human lives already lost in the war and sure to be lost in an invasion of the Japanese home islands, reminding the reader of the extraordinary ferocity of the previous four years' fighting in the Pacific theater, while more importantly revealing the extreme difficulties associated with the invasion of the home islands. These difficulties included not only the massive manpower demands, but also America's increasing war weariness, a shortage of new recruits to round out depleted units of men who had spent years at war, and the many months that would be required to carry out the invasion. Only a narrative firmly grounded in detailed research could convincingly demonstrate the horrible reality of the projected costs of the invasion. The author meets this challenge with aplomb, providing a credible and detailed analysis based on a vast body of evidence, much of which he either reveals for the first time or rescues from the obscurity of decades of historical revision.

Other scholars have omitted or ignored much of this evidence, which is both central to the story told in *Hell to Pay*, and the source of the author's ability to convince the reader that this unbelievable story is all too real. The facts—casualties already suffered and projected, an accurate recounting of the manufacture of Purple Heart medals in anticipation of the invasion (a fascinating story in its own right, and one desperately in need of correction after revisionist distortions over the intervening years), and the details of both sides' plans and the intelligence available to the planners—ensure that the comfortable distance of six decades does not lessen the impact of this fascinating story. The author possesses the rare ability to construct an engaging narrative on the strength of evidence in the form of detailed planning data and intelligence analysis that in a lesser writer's hands might come across as sterile and dry. Most importantly, the author corrects a record that historians, analysts, and critics have far too often misinterpreted, and sometimes willfully misrepresented, in their effort to condemn President Truman for his decision to use the atom bomb.

Hell to Pay is far more than a compelling history of the planning for the invasion of Japan in the final stages of World War II. It represents historical scholarship and engaging writing of the highest caliber and decisively corrects revisionist distortions of one of the war's most controversial decisions. This is a major achievement for the author and a must-read for historians of World War II.

Dr. Mark Calhoun is an assistant professor at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He is a retired Army officer who served over twenty years as an Army aviator and war planner. He holds a bachelor's degree in chemistry, master's degrees in history and advanced operational art, and a Ph.D. in history from the University of Kansas.

Continued from page 3

Many of the above events occurred with only moderate guidance from the various chiefs of military history, using a local chain of command as the decision maker.

It is time to unify the largest elements of this ungainly structure and reorganize them into one entity—the Army History and Heritage Command (AHHC), in my opinion and that of my staff, as a direct reporting unit (DRU) of the Department of the Army.

At one stroke, this unification will maximize the efficiencies inherent in the various key elements of the history community, eliminate redundancies through careful management, streamline missions, and focus each element of the community on its core missions while still supporting the Headquarters, Department of the Army, at the appropriate level.

The AHHC can serve as the "one stop" for the majority of the Army's historical program needs. (Among other elements, this DRU would exclude the faculties of USMA, CGSC, and AWC. Those would remain as parts of their respective faculty systems just as in any other civilian universities.)

The key elements that would fall under the new AHHC, but would remain located at their present stations, would be the following: the U.S. Army Center of Military History (currently part of the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army [OAA]); the Army Heritage and Education Center (currently part of AWC); the Combat Studies Institute (currently part of CGSC); the National Museum of the U.S. Army project (currently in OASA[IE&E]); the highly visible Arlington National Cemetery (ANC) history and museum program (currently under shared ANC-CMH control); and one outlier, The Institute of Heraldry (TIOH). This last addition, while not strictly part of the Army history community, does deal somewhat in using the past to serve the present with unit mottos, colors, insignia, and traditional heraldic symbols. It would remove one additional element from the Department of the Army staff (it is currently under Army Headquarters Services of OAA) while placing it into a congenial, if not entirely natural, command.

This Army History and Heritage Command, headquartered in Washington, D.C., would also serve as the logical headquarters, and over time, as a centralized historical and museum personnel management program. A key element to this type of centralized program is already nearly in place with the establishment of the interim operational capability of Career Program (CP) 61, a centralized training plan, with published standards, for all Army historians, museum professionals, and archivists. Over time, this CP will standardize the selection, hiring, training, promotion, assignments and professional development, and retention of all Army historical and museum personnel, and it is only fitting that it be managed in an Army DRU devoted to history and museums: the **Army History and Heritage Command**.

There are those voices that would like our program divided, so that leadership and policy remained in Washington, while operational facets, including the official histories and museum programs moved to an Army Command, or others who wish to move the entire Army History Program wholesale to an Army Command. These are recipes for disaster! Today, with all its foibles, the Army arguably has one of the top two history programs across the Department of Defense. Unification will only strengthen our position. As status quo is not an option, we must study the organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint History Office, and our sister services. These organizations provide options and insight for our future. Each service organization has advantages and disadvantages; however, disconnecting the Army History Program from HQDA and relegating it to an Army Command follows the Navy example most closely. A simple Google search will provide sufficient details on the folly of this course. Note that when the most senior leaders are not directly engaged, a program will no longer be an *effective* program.

Paraphrasing the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, our new Army History and Heritage Command can provide the knowledge so that our leaders and soldiers understand what it means to be a member of the profession of arms. This is the true mark of any professional military.

So perhaps, as historians, who purportedly never forget the past, we need to take a lesson from Ben Franklin. We all join together now or are eliminated later.

Keep Army History Alive!

NEWSNOTES

Continued from page 5

Ms. Zeidlik receiving a commendation from the former chief of military history, Brig. Gen. James L. Collins Jr., 30 August 1972

In Memoriam
Hannah M. Zeidlik
(1922–2012)

Hannah M. Zeidlik, who had a long career at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), passed away in October 2012. She was 90.

Born in Middle River, Minnesota, in July 1922, Hannah came to Washington, D.C., in 1944 and, in 1950, began what would become a 44-year career with CMH. During that time, she held several positions, including editorial clerk, historian, and archivist, finishing her career as the chief of the Historical Resources Branch. Hannah was instrumental in setting up many of the historical collections on file at the Center. She also provided reference assistance to historians working on the official histories of the U.S. Army and to visitors working on independent projects. After retiring from CMH in 1994, she remained active in local community theater and volunteered for other historical and charitable organizations. She will be missed by many.

The Chief Historian's Footnote

Dr. Richard W. Stewart

Historical, Museum, and Archival "Competencies"

During the development of Career Program (CP) 61's Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS) Plan, one of the major discussions within the community was exactly what each professional community needed to know to do its job. These are called functional competencies by the personnel world. Representatives from each professional community (historians, archivists, and museum personnel) sat down and hammered out a list of the critical skills and knowledge needed by their own peculiar discipline. At the same time, we had to derive what knowledge and skills were common across the entire Career Program. These are called core competencies. They proved to be much harder because, even though we share a love of the past and each of us performs important roles in preserving and interpreting the past for different audiences, we know that there are important differences in how we do that. Historians research, write, teach, and publish sophisticated analyses of past events. Their focus is on the written word. Archivists focus on organizing and making accessible paper and, increasingly, electronic records for their audience of researchers. Museum professionals have many levels of skills, from being able to build exhibits to researching the provenance of three-dimensional artifacts (and two-dimensional art), to preserving them, to building and running museums, to displaying artifacts properly to tell a story. A wide variety of different skills and competencies are needed to perform these very different tasks. Yet, the CP 61 committees, subcommittees, and working groups had to focus on which skills united our community and not which ones were different. I believe they found several key competencies that transcend the entire Career Program.

The six core competencies for the Career Program are

- Knowledge of Career Program Functions
- Administration of Career Program Functions
- Supervision of Career Program Functions
- Knowledge of Professional Methods and Techniques
- Knowledge of History
- Program Advocacy

(To view these competencies and the career maps that show which competencies are most important at which stages of a career in each job series, see the new CP 61 section of the CMH Web site at http://www.history.army.mil/banner_images/focus/CP-61/index.html). The first three of these core competencies should not be controversial since any member of the CP has to know about the program; how to work with it to obtain training, education, and professional development; and how to manage personal, work unit, or organizational aspects of the program. The fourth competency, Knowledge of Professional Methods and Techniques, is likewise self-evident. Regardless of what professional skills, methods, and techniques you are supposed to learn in your profession, you need to master them using a combination of education and experience. And the CP strongly emphasizes having a high level of professional education to enter the profession and then adds experience to those credentials rather than claiming, as has been the case for years in many aspects of the community, that experience trumps education. It doesn't.

The last two core competencies are a little different than the four that preceded them. Knowledge of History should be something that, clearly, each member of the community must have. History is our business. We may approach it in different ways, generate different products, and focus on different aspects of the past, but knowing about the past (especially the American military past) and appreciating the value of the past unites us. Whether you build exhibit cases at Fort Bragg (shout out to Ted Faber!), run a museum at Fort Knox (yes, I mean you Chris Kolakowski), juggle the duties of a command historian at Fort Leonard Wood (that's you Dave Ulbrich), write official histories (the "usual gang of idiots" in Histories Division

at CMH—a term of endearment known to all past readers of *Mad* Magazine), sift through archives at the Military History Institute (calling out to Molly Bompane!), or run entire history programs at the Army Command or Army level, we are all united in knowing and loving history. It is a core competency and it is also a core value.

The final core competency, Program Advocacy, is a bit more controversial. It seemed to some on the various review panels and work groups that to have "advocacy" as a core competency was somehow self-serving and something we should not encourage. Yet, from my own experience at setting up new history positions at Fort Leavenworth (in the Center for Army Lessons Learned) and Fort Bragg (Army Special Operations Command) and working as part of the Department of the Army staff at CMH, I can testify that advocating, protecting, defending, and boosting your history, museum, or archival program is critical to survival. Without the survival of a program, no historian or museum curator can hope to provide the Army the historical, curatorial, preservation, or conservation services it needs, sometime whether the Army admits it needs them or not. Without being a forceful advocate for your program, you will lose resources, personnel slots, and clout in your command and can find yourself increasingly marginalized and irrelevant. Regardless of the regulations or documentation that creates a history or museum program, without forceful and continuous advocacy, it will not survive. Historians, museum professionals, and archivists may believe that their programs are inherently important, but in a time of declining resources, I submit that nothing is inherently important. We must explain, advocate and, yes, sell, our important programs every day to every audience.

In the next issue of *Army History*, I'll talk about functional competencies; specifically, what each separate job series believes is most important to its own particular discipline within the Career Program. Think 61!

As always, you can contact me at Richard.Stewart2@us.army.mil.

ARMY HISTORY

Call For Submissions

Army History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army's history extends to the present day, and *Army History* seeks accounts of the Army's actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, preferably embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. Preferably, a manuscript should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

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Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images by mail to Bryan Hockensmith, Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5060.


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